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Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 19701 in response to grow-
ing outrage over toxic air quality conditions threatening the health
and welfare of the American public. While there is no doubt that
national air quality has dramatically improved over the past three
decades, the Clean Air Act has not been utilized as a mechanism to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions. As a result of this omission, the
role of greenhouse gases in fueling global climate change 2 remains
the most serious environmental issue threatening the world today.
3
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1. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. N. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676-1713 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2000)) [hereinafter CAA].
2. According to the National Academy of Sciences, the term "climate
change" is growing in popularity over the term "global warming" because climate
change conveys that there are changes in addition to rising temperatures, such as
precipitation, wind and storms. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Climate Change: Basic Information, http://epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html
(last accessed June 1, 2008). Although climate change may result from many
natural and anthropogenic factors, the term will be used in this paper to refer to
changes in the composition of Earth's atmosphere caused by human-induced
greenhouse gas emissions.
3. Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Remarks at the Meeting of the American
Academy, University of California, San Diego (Nov. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.amacad.org/publications/bulletin/spring2006/12globalwarming.pdf.
Veerabhadran Ramanathan is the Victor C. Alderson Professor of Ocean Sciences
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Despite the catastrophic harm threatened by climate change, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency has historically refused to regulate
the emission of greenhouse gases, like carbon dioxide.4
This federal inaction has prompted a number of state and local
governments to adopt legislation designed to address climate
change.5 California has taken a leadership role in reducing green-
house gas emissions because the state is particularly vulnerable to
the impacts of climate change. 6 To address these impacts, Governor
Gray Davis enacted Assembly Bill No. 1493 ("AB 1493") in 2002.
The bill empowered the California Air Resources Board ("CARB")
to adopt regulations "that achieve the maximum feasible and cost
effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehi-
cles.",7 The 2004 CARB regulations enacted pursuant to AB 1493
would require the automobile industry to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from new passenger cars, SUVs and pickup trucks sold in
California by an impressive 22 percent in 2012 and by a whopping
30 percent in 2016. Even more impressive, CARB estimates that
the technology required to meet these regulations will cost on aver-
age only about $325 per vehicle in 2012 and about $1050 per vehicle
and Director of the Center for Atmospheric Sciences at the University of Califor-
nia, San Diego.
4. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, President Bush Discusses CAFE and Alternative Fuel Standards, Rose Gar-
den (May 14, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2007/05/20070514-4.html. President George W. Bush directed the U.S. EPA and
the Department of Transportation, Energy and Agriculture to take the first steps
towards enacting regulations that would cut gasoline consumption and greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles using the President's "20-in-10" plan to reduce
energy consumption by 20% by 2017.
5. Michael H. Wall, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and California
Assembly Bill 1493: Filling the American Greenhouse gas Regulation Void, 41 U.
RICH. L. REv. 567 (2004).
6. Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California, Executive Order S-3-05,
June 1, 2005, available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/documents/in-
dex.html.
7. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2007).
8. Greenhouse Gas Exhaust Emission Standards and Test Procedures - 2009
and Subsequent Model Passenger Cars, Light-Duty Trucks, and Medium-Duty
Vehicles, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1 (2007); see AB 1493 Informational
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to comply in 2016.9 The CARB staff analysis of these regulations
concludes that the new rules will result in savings for consumers by
lowering operating expenses that will more than offset the increased
initial costs of new vehicles.' 
0
Despite promising to cut greenhouse gas emissions by nearly one-
third while saving Californians money, AB 1493 has met consider-
able opposition by the automobile industry and the U.S. EPA which
has prevented its implementation. In fact, the EPA has repeatedly
stated that it will not grant California the exemption required under
the federal Clean Air Act in order for the regulations to go into ef-
fect. It is the position of this Article that California has the authority
to regulate automobile greenhouse gas emissions and that the U.S.
EPA should grant California the required exemption to these emis-
sions pursuant to AB 1493. This position is supported by the his-
torical context of the Clean Air Act, which grants California special
status to independently regulate automobile emissions. However,
even outside of this scheme, the Clean Air Act also grants the U.S.
EPA broad authority to regulate these emissions.
Part I of this Article will detail the current scientific understanding
of climate change and the impacts caused by human-induced green-
house gas emissions, including the global scientific consensus of
how climate will be impacted in the future. Part II provides an over-
view of the current air pollution legislative and regulatory frame-
work under the federal Clean Air Act, which simultaneously grants
the U.S. EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions through
the statute's broad definition of air pollutants and also allows Cali-
fornia to enact legislation like AB 1493. Part III outlines the histori-
cal and current political opposition to greenhouse gas emission regu-
lations by the federal government and the U.S. EPA and discusses
the ramification of Massachusetts v. EPA, a recent U.S. Supreme
Court case which establishes that the U.S. EPA has legal authority to
regulate automobile greenhouse gas emissions in order to prevent
global climate change. Part IV discusses the benefits of AB 1493
and what California must establish in order to obtain a waiver from
the U.S. EPA. Finally, Part V advocates why the EPA should grant
California's waiver in order to allow the implementation of AB 1493
regulations and why greenhouse gas regulations similar to AB 1493
9. California Environmental Protection Agency ("Cal. EPA"), California Air
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should be adopted nationally and internationally as a critical step in
preventing catastrophic climate change.
II. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AS A CATALYST FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE
Our planet is warmed through its absorption of approximately sev-
enty percent of the solar energy that reaches its atmosphere." Once
the solar energy is absorbed, climate on Earth is further governed by
the greenhouse effect. The greenhouse effect is a naturally occurring
process where greenhouse gases' 2 allow incoming solar radiation to
enter the planet's atmosphere but prevent most infrared energy from
escaping back into space. 13 Current life on Earth could not be sus-
tained without this natural greenhouse effect, which keeps the
planet's temperature about fifty-nine degrees Fahrenheit warmer than
it would otherwise be. 14
The natural greenhouse effect has been enhanced by human activi-
ties that cause the emission of additional greenhouse gases.' 5 Once
emitted, greenhouse gases travel around the globe and remain in the
atmosphere for many decades. 16 The added greenhouse gases upset
the natural greenhouse effect just like a wool blanket on a cold night
by trapping more outgoing infrared heat within the surface-
atmosphere system and causing the planet to become warmer.
17
11. Ramanathan, supra note 3.
12. Greenhouse gases are any gases absorbed as infrared radiation into the
atmosphere, such as water vapor, carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N20), halogenated fluorocarbons (HCFCs), ozone (03), perfluorinated
carbons (PFCs), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). U.S. EPA, Glossary of Climate
Change Terms, http://epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html (last accessed on June
1,2008).
13. Id.
14. Id. In other words, without the natural greenhouse effect, the Earth would
be a frozen globe, with an average temperature of about five degrees Fahrenheit.
CAL. EPA, CARB, BACKGROUNDER: THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT AND CALIFORNIA,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/factsheets/ccbackground.pdf (last accessed June 1,
2008).
15. U.S. EPA, supra note 12. The rate of increase of greenhouse gases has
accelerated markedly, beyond the natural fluctuation, since the start of the indus-
trial revolution because of the use of machines powered by fossil fuels like coal
and oil. CAL. EPA, supra note 14
16. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW, 5-6 (Michael B. Gerrard ed.,
2007).
17. Ramanathan, supra note 3.
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This enhancement has become more apparent since the Industrial
Revolution, when human-induced activities began causing the emis-
sion of additional greenhouse gases at a noticeable rate.
A. The Study of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
The understanding that our climate could be altered by human-
induced greenhouse gas emissions, like carbon dioxide, coincided
with the commencement of the Industrial Revolution toward the end
of the Nineteenth Century. As early as 1896, Swedish geochemist
Svante Arrhenius deduced that human-induced carbon dioxide emis-
sions could alter Earth's climate when released into the atmos-
phere. 18 He predicted than an increase or decrease of atmospheric
carbon dioxide by forty percent would trigger glacial advances and
retreats. 19
As of 2005, scientists have measured a thirty-five percent increase
of atmospheric carbon dioxide since the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution. 20 The federal government began tracking this increase
in the 1950s, when Charles David Keeling started monitoring at-
mospheric carbon dioxide levels for the U.S. Weather Bureau at a
Mauna Loa observatory in Hawaii. In 1958, Mr. Keeling recorded a
mean level of 315 parts per million of carbon dioxide. 21 By the
1960s, he observed that carbon dioxide levels had already increased
by twenty percent. 22 His observation prompted scientists to explore
how this increase compared with atmospheric concentrations of car-
bon dioxide throughout the history of the earth. By extracting air
18. Naomi Oreskes, The Long Consensus on Climate Change, WASH. POST,
Feb. 1, 2007, at A15.
19. IPCC, HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE: CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 105 (2007) [hereinafter AR4
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW], available at http://www.ipcc.ch..
20. U.S. EPA, Climate Change - Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Carbon Dioxide,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/co2.html (last accessed June 1,
2008).
21. National Research Council, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOME KEY QUESTIONS, 10 (2001) [hereinafter "NRC REPORT"] (315 parts per
millions means that for every one million molecules of air sampled, 315 were
carbon dioxide).
22. Ramanathan, supra note 3. Keeling's observations are considered the first
empirical scientific evidence of global climate change, for which President George
W. Bush awarded Keeling the National Medal of Science in 2002. Naomi
Oreskes, The Long Consensus on Climate Change, supra note 18.
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samples from the Antarctic ice-cores, scientists determined that the
highest carbon dioxide concentrations on Earth had never exceeded
23280 parts per million in the past 420,000 years.
By the time Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970, atmos-
pheric carbon dioxide levels had already reached 325 parts per mil-
lion. 24 The abundance of atmospheric carbon dioxide has continued
to rise exponentially, totaling 367 parts per million in 1999 and then
379 parts per million in 2005. Beyond this recorded thirty-five
percent increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide, scientists have re-
cently used new technology to detect the increasing atmospheric
abundances of other important greenhouse gases, like methane and
nitrous oxide. Atmospheric methane has increased from a 400 to
700 parts per billion range present during the last half-million years
to 1,745 parts per billion in 1998 and 1,774 parts per billion in
2005.26 Similarly, nitrous oxide abundances increased from between
180 to 260 parts per billion over the past half-million years to 314
part per billion in 1998 and to 319 parts per billion in 2005.27 Scien-
tists have demonstrated that the abundances of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere today are greater than at any time during the past one
million years. 28 What this science demonstrates is that more green-
house gases are being emitted into the atmosphere; the additional
gases are storing more heat from being released from the planet,
which has impacted our climate and will continue to change the cli-
mate on Earth.29
B. The Impact of Climate Change
Human-generated greenhouse gases have been credited for increas-
ing the average surface temperature on Earth by about 1.26 degrees
Fahrenheit between the late 1800s and 2000, with over one degree of
23. Russell C. Schnell, State of the Climate in 2005, 87 BULLETIN OF THE
AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY S18 (June 2006), available at
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/ann/annsum2OO5.html.
24. Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1447 (2007)
[hereinafter Mass v. EPA].
25. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Climate Change Science: Atmosphere Changes,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/recentac.html (last accessed June 1,
2008).
26. AR4 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 19, at 100.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. NRC REPORT, supra note 21, at 1.
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that warming having occurred in the past three decades.3° In June
2006, the National Research Council concluded "with a high level of
confidence that global mean surface temperature was the higher dur-
ing the last few decades of the Twentieth Century than during any
comparable period during the proceeding four centuries.,, 31 Accord-
ingly, the year 2006 is now documented as the warmest year in more
than a century,32 replacing 2005 as the warmest year documented.33
To put these records of warming on a more-broad scale, eleven of
the last twelve years represent the twelve warmest years of record
since scientists began monitoring global surface temperature in
1850.34
Recognizing that global climate change was an emerging issue, the
World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme established the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change ("IPCC") in 1988.15 The IPCC's "Fourth Assess-
ment Report: Climate Change 2007" ("AR4") predicts that the
global surface temperature will continue increase by between two
and 11.5 degrees Fahrenheit during this century as human-induced
30. Complaint, People v. Gen. Motors Corp, No. 3:06-cv-05755 (N.D.C.A.)
(Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms06/06-082_0a.pdf.
31. National Academy of Sciences, SURFACE TEMPERATURE
RECONSTRUCTIONS FOR THE LAST 2,000 YEARS (2006), available at
http://darwin.nap.edu/books/030910225 1/html.
32. Bruce Lieberman, Key Study of Global Warming Prepared, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Jan. 28, 2007 at BI.
33. Goddard Institute for Space Studies, National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA), 2005 Warmest Year in Over a Century (2006),
http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/environment/2005 warmest.html.
34. IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS.: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 5 (2007) [hereinafter AR4 SUMMARY], available at
http://www.ipcc.ch.
35. IPCC, About IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm (last accessed
June 1, 2008). The IPCC uses available scientific, technical and socio-economic
information from around the world in order to understand the risk of human-
induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and miti-
gation. Id. The IPCC assessment reports are published every six years and repre-
sent incredible scientific significance for policymakers. For example, the first
volume of the "Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007" was produced
by 600 authors from forty countries and was reviewed by 620 expert scientists.
IPCC Media Advisory, IPCC Adopts Major Assessment of Climate Change Sci-
ence (Feb. 2, 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/press-releases/pr-
02feburary2007.pdf (last accessed June 1, 2008). Before being published, repre-
sentatives from 113 countries reviewed and approved the report line-by-line. Id.
2009]
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greenhouse gas emissions continue to accelerate.36 In addition to
predicting the global impact of climate change, AR4 also focuses on
regional impacts. AR4 predicts that the annual mean warming in
North America is likely to exceed the global mean warming in most
areas. 37 In the northern regions of the continent, where warning is
likely to occur the most during winter, the average surface air tem-
perature will increase by over nine degrees Fahrenheit. 38 In some
parts of Alaska and Canada, the temperature will increase by as
much as eighteen degrees during the winter due to decreased snow
cover.39 In the United States, the annual surface air temperature will
increase by at least four degrees Fahrenheit, but could increase by as
much as over seven degrees. 40 The northern regions of the country
will experience warmer temperatures in the winter and the southwest
41region in the summer.
The warmer temperatures will increase the annual precipitation
experienced over most of the continental United States, except in the
southwest. 42 Like many other water-scarce areas of the world, the
populous southwestern region of the United States will experience
exacerbated water shortages and both droughts and heat waves will
be increased in frequency and duration.43
Many of the projected climate change impacts seem inherently
theoretical. However, the effects of climate are already being ex-
perienced around the world. The global average sea level rose
nearly one foot during the twentieth century.44 This poses a serious
36. AR4 SUMMARY, supra note 34, Table SPM.3. The predicted global tem-
perature increases are dependent upon various scenarios described by the IPCC.
The 2.0-degree increase is the lowest prediction for the "low scenario," character-
ized by a global economy that introduces clean and efficient technologies and
global solutions for environmental sustainability. Id. at 18. The 11.5-degree in-
crease is the highest prediction for the "high scenario," characterized with fossil
fuel-intensive regional growth in new and more efficient technology. Id.
37. IPCC, REGIONAL CLIMATE PROJECTIONS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 887 (2007) [hereinafter AR4].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id., at 889.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 887-88.
43. AR4 SUMMARY, supra note 34, at 8.
44. Brief for Climate Scientists David Battisti et. al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Petitioner at 10, Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2006) (No. 05-1129), 2006
WL 1491307.
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threat of land loss in some parts of the United States. For example in
Massachusetts, where most of the state's 200 miles of coastline is at
slope of less than two percent, the state has lost, and will continue to
lose, more than fifty feet of horizontal land for every foot the sea
rises.45 The State of New York stands to lose thousands of acres of
its territory by the year 2020.46
The impact of rising sea levels poses a more significant threat to
low-lying coastal areas when coupled with other impacts of climate
change, such as the increase of extreme weather events.4 7 One such
extreme weather event resulting from climate change is the expecta-
tion that the number and intensity of hurricanes experienced each
year has increased, and will continue to increase due to climate
change. 48  In North America, the low-laying coastal regions of
southern Florida and the Louisiana / Mississippi Gulf suffered in-
tense hurricane seasons during 2004 and 2005. 41 In fact, 2005 repre-
sented the first time in history that the region experienced Category
5 storms. 50  Hurricane Katrina in 2005 shows how this coupled-
effect can result in tragic impacts upon the health and welfare of
residents within low-laying coastal regions as a result of increased
extreme weather events. Scientists predict that, as ocean tempera-
tures rise and contribute to more extreme weather events, we can
51
expect hurricanes like Katrina to become more common.
Hurricanes do not represent the only anticipated extreme weather
event that is already being experienced. Along with climate change,
scientists predict an increase in extreme rainfall events, such as ex-
cessive damage caused in Mumbai, India during a July 2005 rain-
52storm. Many millions more people are projected to be flooded
45. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2006)
(No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3431932.
46. Id.
47. AR4 SUMMARY, supra note 34.
48. AR4, supra note 37, at 786.
49. IPCC, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), [hereinafter AR4 FAQ], available at
http://www.ipcc.ch.
50. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Climate Change 101: The Science
and Impacts, in CLIMATE CHANGE 101: UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 5, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/
docUploads/climate 101 -FULL_ 121406)065519.pdf.
51. Id. at 6.
52. AR4 FAQ, supra note 49.
2009]
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every year, particularly in the densely populated and low-laying ar-
eas in the mega-deltas of Asia and Africa.53 Additionally, heat
waves have become, and will continue to become, longer lasting and
more frequent extreme weather events. 54 For example, in July 2003,
Europe suffered a heat wave that lasted weeks, rather than days. 55
The rising temperatures have caused the snow cover and ice in the
Arctic to decrease by as much as twenty-five percent since the late
1960s.56
California has independently studied climate change effects within
the state and publicly acknowledged the significant climate change
impacts affecting the health and welfare of its citizens. Human-
induced climate change has already reduced California's snow pack
(a vital source of fresh water in the state), caused an earlier melting
of the snow pack each year,57 raised sea levels along California's
coastline, which threatens 1,100 miles of valuable coastal real estate
53. IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS: WORKING GROUP II
CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 7 (2007) available at http://www.ipcc.ch.
54. IPCC TECHNICAL SUMMARY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE 89 (2007). [hereinafter AR4 TECHNICAL SUMMARY] available
at http://www.ipcc.ch.
55. AR4 FAQ, supra note 49.
56. Brief, supra note 44, at 10.
57. Complaint, People v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-05755 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
20, 2006), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms06/06-082_0a.pdf. The
California Environmental Protection Agency considers the climate change impact
to the state's snow pack a critical concern to California's water supply, providing:
During the winter, high in the Sierra Nevada, snow accumulates in a deep pack,
preserving much of California's water supply in "cold storage" for the hot, dry
summer. If winter temperatures are warmer however, more precipitation will fall
as rain, decreasing the size of the snowpack. Heavier rainfall in the winter could
bring increased flooding. Less spring runoff from a smaller snowpack will reduce
the amount of water available for hydroelectric power production and agricultural
irrigation. Evidence of this problem already exists. Throughout the 201h century,
annual April to July spring runoff in the Sierra Nevada has been decreasing, with
water runoff declining by about ten percent over the last 100 years.
CARB, supra note 14, at 2.
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and natural habitats, 58 increased ozone pollution in urban areas, and
increased the threat of wildfires in the state.59
While the impacts of climate change are already being felt, it is
likely that they will continue to grow on an exponential rate in the
years to come. Scientists made an alarming discovery in May 2007,
when they determined that the Southern Ocean in Antarctica is so
saturated with carbon dioxide that it will no longer be able to absorb
carbon dioxide emissions from the atmosphere. This is significant
because the ocean had traditionally absorbed fifteen percent of hu-
man-induced carbon dioxide emissions and because this impact was
not predicted to occur until the year 2050 or later. 6' This discovery
is also significant because it is the result of other climate change im-
pacts - an increase in surface winds caused by higher global tem-
peratures and by ozone depletion over Antarctica. It is projected
that future climate change with continue to reduce the ability of the
Earth system to absorb carbon dioxide through land and ocean,
which will further enhance the greenhouse effect. 6
3
C. Causes and Sources of Greenhouse Gases Today
Nearly eighty-five percent of human-generated greenhouse gas is
in the form of carbon dioxide, which is primarily emitted through
58. The sea level in California rose between three and eight inches in the last
century, which not only threatens the large populations living along California's
coast, but also can lead to the flooding of low-laying property, the loss of coastal
wetlands, erosion of cliffs and beaches, saltwater contamination of drinking water,
and damage to roads and bridges. CARB, supra note 14, at 2.
59. Complaint, supra note 57. Hotter days lead to higher emissions and more
smog. California Environmental Protection Agency, Air Resources Board, Fact
Sheet: Reducing Climate Change Emissions from Motor Vehicles,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/ccms.htm (last accessed June 1, 2008). This is the
result of more fuel evaporating, engines working harder, an increase in demand for
power, and an increase in power plant air pollution. High temperatures, strong
sunlight, and a stable air mass are ideal for the formation of ground-level ozone,
the most health-damaging constituent of smog; therefore, heat-related health prob-
lems also increase with the temperature. CARB, supra note 14.
60. Southern Ocean Saturated with C02: Study, Reuters, May 17, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN 1623079520070517 (last
accessed June 1, 2008).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. AR4 TECHNICAL SUMMARY, supra note 54, at 89.
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fossil fuel combustion. 64 Transportation is second only to energy
generation in terms of the volume and rate of growth of greenhouse
gas emissions in the United States. 65 Automobile emissions remain
a national concern because the transportation sector has grown ap-
proximately nineteen percent since 1990.66 This sector now ac-
counts for approximately one-third of the country's carbon dioxide
emissions, 67 and about forty percent of California's.
68
In a broader prospective, the U.S. transportation sector alone emits
more carbon dioxide that the entire economy of any other country
except China, which has four times the U.S. population. 69 And the
impact of the U.S. transportation sector on climate change will con-
tinue to grow. Recent consumer preference toward sport utility ve-
hicles and trucks has pushed American fuel economy to the lowest
point in twenty-five years, directly increasing vehicular greenhouse
gas emissions as more fossil fuels are burned.70 Further, the U.S.
EPA projects that transportation-related energy demand will increase
by eighteen percent between 2003 and 2010, and by forty-eight per-
64. U.S. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS:
1990-2005, ES-7, (2007), USEPA #430-R-07-002, available at
http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.html. The emission of
carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion has increased at an average annual rate
of 1.3 percent from 1990 to 2005, growing slowly from 76 percent of emissions in
1990 to 79 percent in 2005. Id.
65. DAVID L. GREENE AND ANDREAS SCHAFER, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS FROM U.S. TRANSPORTATION, (2003), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all-reports/reduce_ghg_
from transportaion.
66. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 21-22 (2001), Rep. No. DOE/EIA-0573, available at
www.eia.doe.gov/ioaf/1605/ggrpt/index.html.
67. OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY, U.S. EPA, GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS FROM U.S. TRANSPORTATION SECTOR 1990-2003, 5 (March 2006),
EPA 420 R 06 003, available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate.htm.
68. Examining The Case For The California Waiver: Hearing on S. 209 Be-
fore the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 10th Cong. 1 (2007)
(Statement of Sen. Boxer, Chairwoman, Sen. Comm. on Environment and Public
Works).
69. PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, TAKING CLIMATE CHANGE
INTO ACCOUNT IN U.S. TRANSPORTATION, http://www.pewclimate.org/
docUploads/ustranspbrief.pdf (last accessed June 1, 2008).
70. Christopher T. Giovinazzo, California's Global Warming Bill: Will Fuel
Economy Preemption Curb California's Air Pollution Leadership?, 30 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 893 (2003) (citing Danny Hakim, Pitting Fuel Economy Against Safety, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2003 at C1).
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cent by 2025, remaining a major source of total U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions. 7 1 Because transportation is the largest and fastest grow-
ing end-use sector, its share will rise to thirty-six percent of national
carbon dioxide emissions by 2020 without regulatory interference or
effective countermeasures.
III. BACKGROUND OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REGULATIONS:
THE CLEAN AIR ACT GRANTS EPA BROAD AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE AIR POLLUTANTS AND ALLOWS CALIFORNIA TO
INDEPENDENTLY ESTABLISH AUTOMOBILE EMISSION STANDARDS
Despite the significant effect of carbon dioxide and other green-
house gases in global climate change, the U.S. EPA has historically
refused to regulate carbon dioxide utilizing the broad discretionary
authority granted to the agency through the federal Clean Air Act of
1970.73 In the absence of statutory or regulatory action, proponents
of greenhouse gas regulations have sought to force federal action
through the existing air pollution control framework. In the face of
these petitions for regulation, and despite determinations from its
counsel that the agency has authority to regulate carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases, the U.S. EPA has refused to enact green-
house gas emission regulations. This section outlines the federal air
pollution control framework, which grants the U.S. EPA authority to
regulate greenhouse gases and also grants California special status to
independently regulate automobile emissions. This section will also
detail the arguments proffered by the U.S. EPA to justify its decision
not to Tegulate greenhouse gas emissions.
71. OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY, supra note 67, at 41.
72. GREENE & SCHAFER, supra note 65. Note that the EPA Report "shows
transportation accounting for the largest absolute increase in energy consumption
of any U.S. economic sector from 2003 to 2025. Transportation energy consump-
tion is expected to be responsible for more than 37 percent of the total increase in
U.S. fuel consumption over this period...." OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR
QUALITY, supra note 67.
73. Nicholle Winters, Carbon Dioxide: A Pollutant in The Air, But Is The EPA
Correct That It Is Not an "Air Pollutant"?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1996 (2004); see
also Janine Maney, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Climate Change, and the Clean
Air Act: An Analysis of Whether Carbon Dioxide Should Be Listed as a Criteria
Pollutant, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298 (2005); Richard W. Thackeray, Jr., Strug-
gling for Air: The Kyoto Protocol, Citizen's Suits Under The Clean Air Act, and
The United States' Options for Addressing Global Climate Change, 14 IND. INT'L
& CoMP. L. REv. 855 (2004).
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A. The Regulatory Framework of the Federal Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act of today is primarily comprised of the Clean
Air Act of 1970. However, relevant air quality legislation was in
place before this enactment. While the Clean Air Act of 1970 dras-
tically rewrote existing legislation, there are some provisions that
originated in previous enactments, which are applicable to automo-
bile emissions. Further, the Clean Air Act of 1970 has been revised
considerably since its enactment, including provisions that are simi-
larly applicable to automobile emissions. Therefore, it is important
to understand the history and application of this important legislation
as it has evolved.
1. Air Pollution Legislation Before the Clean Air Act of 1970 Es-
tablishing California's Independent Authority to Regulate Automo-
bile Emissions
As early as 1955, fifteen years before the EPA was formed, Con-
gress first addressed the issue of national air quality by enacting the
Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 ("APCA").74 The APCA man-
dated federal research programs to investigate how current air qual-
ity conditions were impacting public health and welfare. However,
the APCA was replaced by Congress eight years later with the Clean
Air Act of 1963 ("CAA63").75 CAA63 reallocated to state and local
governments the responsibility of improving air quality conditions
by granting $95 million over a three-year period these entities for the
purposes of conducting research and creating control programs.
76
CAA63, therefore, established an early air pollution control scheme
that granted states sovereign authority and financial support to de-
velop their own regulations. CAA63 also specifically identified both
stationary sources and motor vehicle exhaust emissions as requiring
applicable control standards. 7
Congress later amended CAA63 with the Motor Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion Control Act of 1965. This amendment called for states to
74. Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322
(1955).
75. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79
Stat. 992 (1965).
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adopt practical vehicle emissions standards for all substances that
"cause or contribute to, or are likely to cause or to contribute to, air
pollution which endangers the health or welfare of any persons,"
while considering the technological feasibility and economic costs of
such standards. 79 A subsequent amendment in 1966 granted state
and local governments additional funds to develop air pollution con-
trol standards. 80 While these amendments did not result in automo-
bile greenhouse gas emission standards, the legislative framework
during this period is important because it allowed each state to de-
velop its own air pollution control standards. During this period,
California independently enacted the California Motor Vehicle Pol-
lution Control Act in 1960, the first automobile emission legislation
in the United States. 81 Because California was the only state with
vehicle emissions standards in place when Congress later called for a
federal vehicle emission regulatory scheme, California remains the
only state with some authority to independently regulate automobile
emissions today.
The move toward a federal air pollution control scheme began in
1967, when Congress again amended CAA63 by enacting the Air
Quality Act.82 The 1967 Amendment reaffirmed the prevention and
control of air pollution as the primary responsibility of state and lo-
cal governments, but the amendment also acknowledged the essen-
tial role of federal financial assistance and leadership in air pollution
83control programs. Through this amendment, Congress granted the
federal government the central role of establishing national air qual-
ity control regions and issuing to the states ambient air quality stan-
dards and recommended control techniques.84 States, then, could
either develop a state implementation plan (SIP), which meets the
national air quality standards, or the state could adopt the federal air
quality program that was being developed at the time of the amend-
ment. 
85
79. Id. § 202.
80. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954-55
(1966).
81. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE
ESSAY ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR
POLLUTION 1940-1975 Ch. 10 (1977).
82. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 91-137, 83 Stat. 283 (1967) [herein-
after CAA67].
83. Id. § 101.
84. Id. § 107.
85. Id. § 108.
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The second part of the 1967 amendment, known as the National
Emission Standards Act, was the first enactment that empowered the
federal government to prescribe standards for new motor vehicle
emissions. 86 The amendment empowered the federal government to
develop motor vehicle emission regulations for "any substances that
endanger public health or welfare," while considering "technological
feasibility and economic costs." 87 The amendment expressly pre-
empted state governments from adopting independent motor vehicle
emission standards. 88  However, the enactment provides that the
"[EPA] Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public
hearing, waive [federal preemption] to any State which has adopted
standards... for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, unless [the EPA
Administrator] finds that such State does not require standards more
stringent than applicable Federal standards to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions."
89
As stated above, because California had enacted mobile source
emission regulations in 1960,90 it qualifies for a waiver of federal
preemption and therefore remains the only state today that can inde-
pendently regulate these sources of pollution. The enactment of this
provision is a critical element in the debate that exists today as to
whether California should be granted a waiver to regulate automo-
bile greenhouse gas emissions. Just as this provision is in dispute
today, the important issue of federal preemption was the "most
heated conflict in the course of considering [CAA67]." 91 The origi-
nal version of CAA67 preempted all state regulations and would
have preempted the program California had in place. 92  Senator
George Murphy of California, however, revised the amendment be-
fore it was enacted to provide the waiver for states that had vehicle
emission programs in place. 93 Senator Murphy's version, adopted
by the Senate, required that the waiver must be granted unless oppo-
nents proved the state does not require standards more stringent that
86. Id. § 201.
87. Id. § 202(a).
88. Id. § 208(a).
89. Id. § 208(b).
90. See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 81.
91. Id. at 181.
92. 113 Cong. Rec. 30,941 (1967).
93. Id. See also KRJER & URSIN, supra note 81, at 181.
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applicable federal standards to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions. 
94
When the bill reached the House of Representatives, Congressman
John Dingell of Detroit amended the relevant section to allow for
waivers only upon the showing that a state requires more stringent
standards than the national standards. 95  This amendment clearly
shifted the burden to California to establish that stricter standards
were required in the state. Californians were outraged that they
could pioneer air pollution control methods and "were now in danger
of being preempted by the federal government that had so long fol-
lowed in their footsteps" for the sake of satisfying the financial in-
terests of Detroit automakers. 96 California successfully campaigned
and the version adopted thus presumes California is entitled to a
waiver and places the burden of proof upon the party opposing the
waiver to prove the more stringent standards are not required.97 The
U.S. EPA must consider this same presumption today when consid-
ering whether to grant California a waiver to regulate automobile
greenhouse gas emissions.
2. Clean Air Act of 1970: Establishing the National Regulation of
Criteria Pollutants But Not Modifying California's Waiver Provision
After decades of pollution-related deaths and illnesses in the
United States, 98 and around the world,99 the year 1970 marked sub-
94. 113 Cong. Rec. 30,941 (1967) [emphasis added]; see also S. Rep. No. 90-
403, at 33-34 (1967).
95. H.R. Rep. No. 90-728, at 22 (1967) [emphasis added].
96. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 81, at 182. California delegates reportedly
received as many as 400,000 letters from their constituents urging the delegates to
"[wage] their war against preemption." Id. Opposition to the preemption provi-
sion was further fueled by a radio program in California, the "Breath of Death,"
which uncovered the automobile industry's role in influencing Congressman
Dingell to push for the preemption provision. Id. It was even discovered that the
amendment was drafted in the Washington headquarters of the Automobile Manu-
facturers Association. Id.
97. Rachel L. Chanin, California's Authority to Regulate Mobile Source
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, New York University Annual Survey of American
Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 699, 714-716 (2003).
98. Air pollution episodes, widely mistaken for Japanese gas attacks, were first
reported in the Los Angeles basin as early as the 1940s. KRIER & URSIN, supra
note 81, at 52 (citing R. Dyck, Evolution of Federal Air Pollution Control Policy
19 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh)). One early-
recognized episode of smog in Los Angeles occurred during the summer of 1943,
where visibility was only three blocks and residents reportedly suffered from
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stantial national determination to improve the condition of the envi-
ronment. The nation celebrated Earth Day for the first time on
Wednesday, April 22.100 President Richard Nixon created the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to clean the nation's wa-
ter and air from pollution.' 0' And Congress enacted the Clean Air
Act of 1970 ("CAA").10 2 Although these events mark substantial
progress toward improving national air quality conditions, the under-
standing of climate change was in its mere infancy at that time.'
0 3
smarting eyes, respiratory discomfort, nausea, and vomiting. NOW on the News:
Science and Health: Air Wars - California's Auto Emissions Laws, PBS television
broadcast (Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/now/science/caauto-
emissions2.html. Toxic air pollution episodes began to affect residents of rural
areas throughout the United States as well. In October 1948, industrial air pollu-
tion from surrounding areas struck rural Donora, Pennsylvania, initially killing
eighteen people over a three-day period. See DEVRA DAVIS, WHEN SMOKE RAN
LIKE WATER: TALES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECEPTION AND THE BATTLE AGAINST
POLLUTION (2002).
99. Urban areas around the world, like London, England, were similarly
plagued with toxic air pollution conditions during this era. For example, in what
became known as the "Great Fog of 1952" or "London's Killer Fog," a toxic mix
of dense fog and sooty black coal smoke killed thousands of Londoners in a four-
day period that started on December 5, 1952. Days of Toxic Darkness, BBC
NEWS, Dec. 5, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/2542315.stm (last ac-
cessed June 1, 2008). The sooty fog was so thick that headlamps were useless and
automobiles needed to be guided by passengers on foot. Id. The fog was first
regarded as just another of many reoccurring toxic air pollution episodes in the
city, until the fog began to lift and bodies were found dead on the streets and in
their cars throughout the city. Id. But by the end of the week, the death count had
reached over 4,700 people at a rate of 800 to 900 people per day, cattle in the sur-
rounding areas were found asphyxiated, and the death rate continued through the
end of the year. The Met Office, The Great Smog of 1952,
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/education/secondary/students/smog.html (last ac-
cessed June 1, 2008). The episode remains the deadliest environmental episode in
recorded history and is credited for dramatically changing the way the world
viewed air pollution, which had otherwise become a common way of life in urban
areas. All Things Considered: The Killer Fog of '52, NPR radio broadcast (Dec.
11, 2002), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?sto-
ryld=873954.
100. EPA, The Guardian: Origins of the EPA, Introduction,
http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/origins.htm (last accessed June 1, 2008).
101. Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, EPA Journal, Nov. 1985, available at
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/epa/l 5c.htm (last accessed June 1, 2008).
102. CAA, supra note 1.
103. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1447 (2007). The court cites to the 1970 "First
Annual Report" of the Council on Environmental Quality, which concludes that
"[m]an may be changing his weather" in concluding that uncertainty over climate
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While CAA does not regulate greenhouse gases or seek to prevent
climate change, it is important to understand the regulatory scheme
established by the act because this scheme is still regulates air qual-
ity conditions today.
Today's CAA still maintains that air pollution is a matter of pri-
marily state responsibility.10 4 The federal government's role is to
establish national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for air
pollutants that will protect public health and welfare. 105 The EPA
Administrator establishes NAAQS through a multi-step process:
First, to be regulated under the CAA, the Administrator must de-
termine that the substance is an "air pollutant." Section 302(g)
broadly defines an air pollutant as "any air pollution agent or combi-
nation or agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radio-
active substance or matter which is emitted into other or otherwise
enters the ambient air." 10 6 Additionally, the Administrator has dis-
cretion to identify as an air pollutant "any precursors to the forma-
tion of any air pollutant." 0 7 This inclusive definition of air pollutant
clearly indicates that Congress intended to grant the EPA broad
regulatory authority. 1
08
The EPA Administrator must next determine that the emission of
the air pollutant into ambient air: (1) causes or contributes to "air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare," and (2) results from "numerous or diverse mobile
or stationary sources." 10 9 Upon this determination, the EPA Admin-
change and was largely unmentioned during the congressional enactment of the
Clean Air Act. Id. n. 8. But the note also cites to Senator Bogg's statement re-
garding the Council's conclusion that air pollution alters climate and may produce
global changes in temperature. Id.
104. CAA, supra note 1, § 107.
105. Id. § 109(b).
106. Id. § 7602(g).
107. Id.
108. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has interpreted this specific
section to define air pollutant "extremely broadly." Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636
F.2d 323, 352, n. 60 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 520
U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (noting that "'any' has an expansive meaning"); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) ("in choosing such expansive
terms.. .modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that
the [statute] would be given wide scope."); Nicolle Winters, Carbon Dioxide: A
Pollutant in the Air, But is the EPA Correct that it is Not an "Air Pollutant"?, 104
COLUM. L. R. 1996, 2004 (2004).
109. CAA, supra note 1, § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B). Instead of "cause or contribute
to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
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istrator is charged with identifying the possible health and welfare
effects of listed air pollutants based on the latest scientific knowl-
edge to finally establish the NAAQS. 1 0 Along with this standard,
the Administrator is required to provide to the states information
about the air pollutants, including: effects on public health and wel-
fare, control techniques and the technology and costs of emission
control for the listed pollutants.' 1 ' This information is called "air
quality criteria," which is how the air pollutants regulated by
NAAQS have come to be referred to as "criteria pollutants." The
states, then, submit to the EPA state implementation plans ("SIPs")
detailing compliance with the NAAQS for criteria pollutants." 2 The
EPA steps in where states fail to develop SIPs or meet the federal
standards. 113
Today, the NAAQS scheme regulates six criteria pollutants in the
air: ozone, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, lead
and particulate matter. 114 However, Congress did not intend for the
initial list to remain static. CAA Section 108(a)(1) states that the
EPA Administrator "shall from time to time.. .revise" the list of cri-
teria pollutants regulated under the NAAQS scheme. 115 Addition-
ally, Section 108(c) provides that the EPA Administrator "shall from
time to time review, and, as appropriate, modify, and reissue any
criteria or information on control techniques." ' 1 6 Further, Section
110(g) requires that in order for the EPA Administrator to approve a
state plan, the SIP must provide for revision from time to time as
may be necessary to take into account revisions to the federal
NAAQS scheme, the availability of improved or more expeditious
methods of achieving the standards, or whenever the EPA Adminis-
welfare," the language of the 1970 CAA based the Administrator's determination
upon "his judgment [that the air pollutant] has an adverse effect on public health
or welfare." Id. § 108(a)(1). The provision was revised in 1977 to read as it does
today. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat 685 (1977). Thus, the 1977 revision broadened
the Administrator's ability to regulate air pollutants, a term also broadly-defined
under the CAA.
110. CAA, supra note 1, § 108(2).
111. Id. § 108(b)(1).
112. Id. § 107(a).
113. Id. § 108(c)(2).
114. 40 C.F.R. Part 50. See note 118, below, regarding the addition of lead as a
criteria pollutant through a citizen suit.
115. CAA, supra note 1, § 108(a)(1).
116. Id. § 108(c).
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trator finds the SIP substantially inadequate. 117  Finally, it is also
clear that Congress intended for a dynamic list of criteria pollutants
because the CAA provides for citizen suits in order to compel the
EPA Administrator to act" 8 and for judicial review of enumerated
actions by the Administrator." 
9
While CAA substantially created the statutory framework in place
today for criteria air pollutants, CAA did not drastically modify the
federal regulatory system for motor vehicle emissions that was cre-
ated by CAA67. Section 202(a)(1) of CAA empowered the EPA to
prescribe emission standards for any air pollutant from any class of
new motor vehicles, which in the Administrator's judgment "causes
or contributes to, or is likely to cause or to contribute to, air pollution
which endangers the public health or welfare,"' 120  and granted the
Administrator the authority to revise such regulations from time to
time. 121 Notable absent from CAA, is any amendment to the federal
117. Id. § 110(g).
118. Id. § 304(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2)). See, George L. Blum,
J.D., Statutory Standing to Sue Under Clean Air Act's Citizen Suit Provision, 42
U.S.C.A. § 7604, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 369 (originally published in 2006). The citi-
zen suit provision was successfully used to compel the EPA Administrator to list
lead as a criteria pollutant, and to establish NAAQS for lead, pursuant to Section
108 of the CAA. NRDC v. Train, 411 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The EPA
had conceded that lead pollution met the Section 108(a)(1) elements for regulation
because the substance was an air pollutant, caused or contributed to air pollution
that endangered public health and welfare, and resulted from numerous sources,
but the EPA relied on the discretion of the Administrator in not regulating lead. Id.
at 867. District Court Justice Charles E. Stewart, Jr., concluded that Section 108
enumerated conditions, one factual and one judgment, upon which the Administra-
tor shall list and regulate the pollutant. Id. 868 emphasis added). The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding "the interpretation of
the Clean Air Act advanced by the EPA is contrary to the structure of the Act as a
whole, and.. would vitiate the public policy underlying [the Act] and its legisla-
tive history." NRDC v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 324 (1976); Thackeray, supra note
73.
119. Id. § 307(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)). For a comprehensive
review of such actions, see William B. Johnson, Construction and application of§
307(b)(1) of Clean Air Act (42 U.S. C.A. § 7607(b)(1)) pertaining to judicial re-
view by courts of appeals, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 604 (originally published in 1988).
120. Id. § 202(a)(1). In addition to this general authority, CAA specifically
called for regulations that would result in at least a ninety percent reduction of
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons (Id. § 202(b)(1)(A)) and a ninety percent re-
duction of nitrogen oxide (Id. § 202(a)(1)(B)).
121. Id. § 202(a)(1).
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preemption provision established in CAA67.1 22 Therefore, the con-
troversial California preemption waiver provision of CAA67, which
presumes that California is entitled to regulate automobile emissions
independent from the federal system, withstood its first opportunity
to be overturned.
3. Amendments to the Clean Air Act Since 1970 Related to Auto-
mobile Emissions
The CAA was amended in 1977 ("CAA77") 123 and directly ad-
dressed the California automobile emission waiver provision in two
significant ways. First, CAA77 revised § 209 by requiring the EPA
Administrator to grant California a waiver to independently regulate
outside the federal system if "the state determines that the state stan-
dards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health
and welfare as the applicable federal standards."1 24 This provision is
significant because it allows California to make its own determina-
tion as to whether the regulations are sufficiently protective, rather
than leaving the decision to the EPA Administrator. Further, the
determination is made by looking at the entire regulatory system as a
whole, rather than evaluating each regulation individually. In the-
ory, the amendment would allow California to adopt emission stan-
dards that are not directly related to protecting the public health and
welfare so long as the whole set of regulations, together, is more
protective than the federal system.
CAA77 is also significant because it enhanced the strength of Cali-
fornia's automobile emission program by allowing other states to
adopt the California standards instead of the federal standards.
25
122. Recall this preemption provision prevented states from adopting independ-
ent motor vehicle emission standards, except it provided for a California waiver
because the state had been regulating such emissions before CAA67.
123. Act to Amend the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
[hereinafter CAA77].
124. Id. § 207, amending CAA § 209(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7543).
125. Id. § 177 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7507). This provision does not require
states adopting the California standards to show a compelling or extraordinary
need for the standard, or even to show that the standards are required in the state.
Therefore, California bears the initial burden of establishing a need for the regula-
tion. Other states may later adopt the standard without any burden of proof. While
this may seem unfair, it encourages other states to adopt the California standards.
If that occurs, the automobile industry is stripped of any argument that the Cali-
fornia standards are too expensive or burdensome to develop for implementation
in only one state.
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Thus, motor vehicles could be either "federal cars designed to meet
the EPA's standards or California cars designed to meet California
standards."' 126 This provision demonstrates Congress's recognition
that the regulatory independence granted to California had resulted
in a successful automobile emission program that would benefit
other states. In 1970, California's Senator Murphy had "convinced
his colleagues that the entire country would benefit from his state's
continuing its pioneering efforts, California serving as a kind of
laboratory for innovation." 27 Indeed, by the 1977 amendment, Cali-
fornia was already ahead of the federal program and had utilized its
waiver to enact benchmark automobile emission legislation. 1
28
Finally, CAA was most recently amended in 1990 ("CAA90"). 129
This amendment affects the issue of the California motor vehicle
emissions waiver and the regulation of greenhouse gases in several
ways. First, in order to avoid any confusion with respect to the
automobile emission waiver provision of the CAA, CAA90 reiter-
ated that states must choose between two vehicle emission regula-
tory programs, either the federal program or the California program,
and that no state can modify those standards in such as way that
would result in the creation of a "third vehicle."
130
Next, CAA90 introduced to the CAA framework the first regula-
tions regarding greenhouse gases and climate change, a new title
called "Stratospheric Ozone Protection." 131 By enacting this provi-
sion, Congress used the CAA to require the phasing out, and even-
tual termination of production, of ozone-depleting substances, such
as chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs")132 and hydrochlorofluorocarbons
126. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 88 F.3d 1075, 1080 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York State Dep't of Envtl.
Conserv., 17 F.3d 521, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1994)).
127. Id.
128. For example, by 1977, California had already banned the sale of leaded
gasoline, commenced its regulation of total suspended particulates, photochemical
oxidants, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and carbon monoxide (all of which the
state independently determined were causing smog), and instituted random road-
side inspections by the Highway Patrol to ensure catalytic converters, any other
emission reducing mechanisms developed by the state, were in place. Air Wars,
supra note 98.
129. Act to Amend the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990) [hereinafter CAA90].
130. Id. § 232, amending CAA § 177 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7507).
131. Title VII - Stratospheric Ozone Protection, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-
7671p (2000).
132. Id. § 604, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7671c.
2009]
62 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
("HCFCs"). 133  Congress's recognized these greenhouse gases as
affecting climate change, and the EPA also identified these pollut-
ants as greenhouse gases that affect climate. 134 This provision of
CAA90 charged the EPA Administrator with publishing the global
warming potential of each substance, but also expressly prohibits the
global warming potential from serving as a basis by which the pol-
lutants would be regulated under the CAA. 13 5 In other words, the
provision allowed the CAA to regulate these greenhouse gases, rec-
ognized that greenhouse gases impact climate change, but then disal-
lowed the climate change impact from serving as a basis for regulat-
ing the gases under the CAA. This enactment has been cited by op-
ponents of carbon dioxide regulations to demonstrate Congress's
reluctance to utilize the CAA framework as authority for EPA to
regulate greenhouse gases, and thus as a mechanism for preventing
climate change.
This reluctance may be further demonstrated by the fact that Sec-
tion 821 of CAA90 was never codified into the United States Code.
The provision, which was named "Information Gathering on Green-
house Gases Contributing to Global Climate Change," if enacted,
would have required carbon dioxide emissions monitoring as part of
utility permitting under the CAA. Finally, the reluctance to regulate
carbon dioxide under the CAA scheme may be shown by Section
103(g) of the amendment, which called on the EPA to develop "non-
regulatory" measures to prevent the emission of multiple air pollut-
ants, listing carbon dioxide as one such pollutant. 13 6 While this sec-
133. Id. § 605, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7671d.
134. EPA, Overview: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
http://www.epa.gov/oar/caa/overview.txt (last accessed September 1, 2007).
135. CAA, supra note 1, § 767la(e).
136. CAA90, supra note 129, § 103(g), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g), provid-
ing:
[T]he Administrator shall conduct a basic engineering research and technology
program to develop, evaluate, and demonstrate nonregulatory strategies and tech-
nologies for air pollution prevention. Such strategies and technologies shall be
developed with priority on those pollutants which pose a significant risk to human
health and the environment and with opportunities for participation by industry,
public interest groups, scientists, and other interested persons in the development
of such strategies and technologies. Such program shall include the following
elements:
(1) Improvements in nonregulatory strategies and technologies for preventing or
reducing multiple air pollutants, including sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, heavy
metals, PM-10 (particulate matter), carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide, from
stationary sources, including fossil fuel power plants. Such strategies and tech-
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tion demonstrates Congressional intent to reduce the emission of
carbon dioxide, opponents of greenhouse gas emissions regulations
argue that this provision limits the EPA's authority to only nonregu-
latory methods for reducing carbon dioxide emissions. 
1 37
4. Summary of the Clean Air Act Regulatory Scheme
There are two distinct provisions of the CAA under which the U.S.
EPA could regulate carbon dioxide, and other greenhouse gases.
The first provision would regulate carbon dioxide as a criteria air
pollutant, pursuant to Title I of the CAA, if the EPA Administrator
determines that "(A) emissions of [the air pollutant]... cause or con-
tribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to en-
danger public health or welfare, [and] (B) the presence of [the air
pollutant] in the ambient air results from numerous or diverse mobile
or stationary sources." 138 Upon a similar finding, the EPA Adminis-
trator could also regulate carbon dioxide from motor vehicles pursu-
ant to Title II of the CAA. 139 Despite the broad authority of the EPA
to regulate criteria air pollutants granted by the CAA, the EPA has
not implemented the CAA to regulate carbon dioxide.
Apart from the U.S. EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions, the CAA scheme allows for California to independently
regulate motor vehicle emissions if granted a waiver from federal
preemption. The history of the Congressional consideration of the
nologies shall include improvements in the relative cost effectiveness and long-
range implications of various air pollutant reduction and nonregulatory control
strategies such as energy conservation, including end-use efficiency, and fuel-
switching to cleaner fuels. Such strategies and technologies shall be considered for
existing and new facilities." (emphasis added)
Note that CAA90 section 103(g) relates only to the emission of carbon dioxide
from stationary sources, like fossil fuel power plants, and does not relate to mobile
sources, like automobile emissions. Also note that, despite being listed in CAA90
section 103(g) for nonregulatory reduction strategies, federal motor vehicle emis-
sion regulations exist for both nitrogen oxide and carbon monoxide. Finally, de-
spite being listed in CAA90 section 103(g) for nonregulatory reduction strategies,
California currently regulates the automobile emission of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxide, and carbon monoxide. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1950 et. seq.
137. This argument will be discussed in more detail below. For now, suffice it
to say that the argument is weak, considering that both the federal and California
automobile emission programs regulate other air pollutants listed within section
103(g).
138. CAA, supra note 1, § 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B).
139. Id. § 7521(a)(1).
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waiver provision indicates that Congress intended for California to
act as a laboratory for innovation, thereby "intend[ing] the State to
continue and expand its pioneering efforts at adopting and enforcing
motor vehicle emission standards different from and in large meas-
ure more advanced than the corresponding federal program."140 The
provision requires the EPA to grant California a waiver upon the
state's own determination that its program would be at least as pro-
tective to public health and welfare as the federal program, in the
aggregate. 141 Therefore, even if the EPA elects to not regulate car-
bon dioxide under the broad authority granted to the agency under
the CAA, California can independently regulate the emission of the
greenhouse gas through a waiver granted by the EPA.
B. EPA s Refusal to Regulate Greenhouse Gases as Air Pollutants
Under the Clean Air Act
Despite the broad authority granted to the EPA by the CAA to
regulate air pollutants to protect human health and welfare, the U.S.
EPA has continually refused to regulate greenhouse gases like car-
bon dioxide. The EPA has failed to regulate carbon dioxide even
after its own legal counsel determined the agency has authority to
regulate carbon dioxide and even in light of petitions from concerned
Americans for the agency to do so. This section will detail the
EPA's decision to not regulate the air pollutant carbon dioxide,
thereby failing to satisfy its duty to protect the health and welfare of
Americans from the threat of global climate change.
1. EPA General Counsel During Clinton Administration Finds Au-
thority to Regulate Carbon Dioxide Pursuant to the Authority of the
Clean Air Act
The primary role of the EPA General Counsel is to provide legal
advice to the agency, which includes assisting the EPA in making
decisions, rules and interpreting legislation. 142 As such, EPA should
logically exercise its discretionary authority under the CAA pursuant
to the legal advice of the EPA General Counsel. However, the EPA
140. Motor and Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 627 F.2d 1095,
1110-11 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
141. CAA, supra note 1, § 7543.
142. U.S. EPA, Office of General Counsel, About Us, http://www.epa.gov/ogc/
aboutus.htm (last accessed June 1, 2008).
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has continually argued that it lacks authority to regulate carbon diox-
ide emission despite the findings of two EPA General Counsel that
the agency has such authority under the CAA.
In April 1998, the EPA General Counsel at the time, Jonathon
Cannon, concluded in a memorandum to the EPA Administrator at
the time, Carol Browner, that carbon dioxide meets the definition of
an "air pollutant" based on Section 302(g) of the CAA 143 because it
is a "physical [and] chemical... substance which is emitted into.. .the
ambient air." 144 Although Cannon determined carbon dioxide, and
the other greenhouse gases, met the EPA's general authority for
regulation under the CAA, he stated that the pollutants required "an
EPA determination that [the] particular air pollutant meets the spe-
cific criteria for EPA action." I 5 He referred to several provisions of
the CAA that established the criteria for EPA action as the "determi-
nation by the Administrator regarding the air pollutants' actual or
potential harmful effects on public health, welfare or the environ-
ment."' 146 Thus, he concluded, even though the EPA had authority to
regulate carbon dioxide as an "air pollutant" under the CAA, the
EPA has made no determination to exercise its authority under the
CAA. 1
47
Gary Guzy later succeeded cannon as EPA General Counsel in
November 1998.148 In Congressional testimony, Guzy supported
143. Recall that Section 302(g) of the CAA defines an "air pollutant" as "any
physical, chemical, biological, or radioactive substance or matter that is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air." CAA, supra note 1, § 7602(g) (2000).
144. Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, EPA, to Carol
M. Browner, Administrator, EPA (Apr. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Cannon Memoran-
dum], available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/environment/casebook/docu-
ments/EPACO2.pdf. The Cannon Memorandum is a legal opinion written in re-
sponse to Congressman Tom DeLay's March 11, 1998, inquiry to EPA Adminis-
trator Browner as to whether the EPA had authority to regulate sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxide, carbon dioxide and mercury from electrical power generation. Id.
at 1. EPA Administrator Browner initially confirmed that the EPA does have
authority under the CAA to regulate carbon dioxide and requested that Cannon
draft a legal opinion on that point. Id.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id. at 3 (referencing CAA sections 108, 109, 111(b), 112, and 115, and
also, generally, CAA sections 202(a), 211 (c), 231, 612, and 615).
147. Id. at 5. Cannon noted that EPA already regulated sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
dioxide and mercury based on determinations by the EPA or Congress that those
substances had a negative effect on public health. Id. at 4.
148. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, President Clinton Names Gary S. Guzy to Serve as General Counsel at the
Environmental Protection Agency (Nov. 17, 1998), available at
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Cannon's conclusion that "[carbon dioxide], as an 'air pollutant,' is
within the regulatory authority provided by the [CAA]," and that
carbon dioxide could be regulated by the EPA if any of the CAA's
prerequisites for regulation are met. 14 Guzy testified that many of
the CAA's provisions related to these prerequisites for regulation
"share a common feature... that the EPA's authority to regulate air
pollutants is linked to a determination by the Administrator regard-
ing the air pollutant's actual or potential harmful effects on public
health, welfare or the environment."' 150  Aside from the standard
Section 108 determination for an air pollutant's potential harmful
effect, 151 Guzy cited a section of the 1970 version of CAA which
"included effects on 'climate' as a factor to be considered in the
Administrator's decision as to whether to list an air pollutant under
Section 108." 152
Guzy asserted that there was no "statutory ambiguity" as to fact
that the CAA clearly defines "air pollutant" and provides EPA with
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/111 798-president-names-gary-guzy-as-
general-counsel-at-the-epa.htm.
149. Legal Authority Provided by the Clean Air Act (Act) to Regulate Emissions
of Carbon Dioxide: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomms. on National Econ.
Growth and Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs of the H, Comm. on Gov-
ernment Reform and the Subcomm. On Energy and Environment of the H. Comm.
on Science, 105th Cong. (1999) (statement of Gary S. Guzy) [hereinafter Guzy
Testimony], available at http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/
106_ 1999_2000/100699gg.htm.
150. Id.
151. Recall that Section 108 states the Administrator must first find that the air
pollutant in question meets several criteria, including that: (A) it causes or contrib-
utes to "air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare" and (B) its presence in the ambient air "results from numerous
or diverse mobile or stationary sources." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A)-
(B)).
152. Id Section 302(h) of the 1970 version of CAA defines "welfare" and
states:
all language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to, effects
on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man-made materials, animals, wildlife, weather,
visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to
transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and
well-being, whether caused by transformation, conversion, or combination with
other air pollutants.
Id. (citing CAA § 302(h)). While the Guzy Testimony highlights that carbon diox-
ide may impact "welfare" by effecting climate, Part I of this Article cites to scien-
tific findings that carbon dioxide emissions will also affect many of the other con-
siderations listed under Section 302(h).
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the authority to regulate air pollutants. 153 Therefore, he concluded,
carbon dioxide "is in the class of compounds that could be subject to
several of the [CAA]'s regulatory approaches."' 154 However, Guzy
also reiterated Cannon's point that EPA had not yet determined that
carbon dioxide met the criteria for regulation under a specific provi-
sion of CAA. 1
55
2. EPA & EPA General Counsel During George W. Bush Admini-
stration Refuse to Regulate Carbon Dioxide Even When Petitioned
for Rulemaking
The EPA did not act on the petition until after the Bush Admini-
stration took office and Robert Fabricant replaced Gary Guzy as
EPA General Counsel in 2001.156 The EPA submitted the ICTA
petition for public comment on January 23, 2001 and received more
than 50,000 comments over the following five months. 157 Before
the close of the comment period, the White House asked the Na-
tional Research Council to investigate the science of climate
change.158 The report concluded that "[g]reenhouse gases are accu-
mulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, caus-
ing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to




155. Id. Guzy further testified that "many of the concerns raised about the
statutory authority to address [carbon dioxide] relate more to factual and scientific,
rather than legal, questions regarding whether and how the criteria for regulation
under the [CAA] could be satisfied." In other words, the EPA Administrator
would have to make an endangerment finding based upon the factual and scientific
determination that carbon dioxide "causes of contributes to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." CAA, supra
note 1, § 7408(a)(1).
156. In fact, after three years without a response, ICTA and the Sierra Club
sued the EPA for unreasonable delay and compelled the EPA to answer the peti-
tion. ICTA, A Guide to the Supreme Court's Case on Global Warming, Nov. 27,
2006, http://www.icta.org/doc/SupCtMediaGuide%2011-27-06.pdf; see also
Complaint, International Center for Technology Assessment v. Whitman, No. 02-
2376/RBW (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://www.icta.org/doc/
C02PetAmendCompliant.pdf.
157. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed.
Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003) [hereinafter EPA Denial] (notice of denial of petition
for rulemaking).
158. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1449 (2007)
159. Id. (citing NRC REPORT, supra note 21, at 1).
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Despite these findings, and the conclusions of two former EPA
General Counselors that EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse
gases, the EPA ultimately denied the ICTA petition for rulemaking
on September 8, 2003. The agency's decision to deny the petition
relies heavily upon a memorandum written by Fabricant to the Act-
ing Administrator, Marianne Horinko, on August 18, 2003. In the
memorandum, Fabricant withdrew Cannon's 1998 memorandum as
"no longer representing the views of the EPA's General Counsel,"
concluding that the "CAA does not authorize EPA to regulate
[greenhouse gases] to address global climate change." 160 Fabricant
criticized the Cannon Memorandum for defining air pollutants so
broadly that "virtually anything entering the ambient air [is a pollut-
ant] regardless of whether it pollutes the air."1 6 1 Fabricant con-
cluded that EPA cannot assert jurisdiction to regulate, as petitioned,
after considering the history, text and structure of the CAA in the
context of other congressional actions addressing global climate
change and in light of Supreme Court precedent at the time. 162
The EPA determined, in its denial of the ICTA petition for rule-
making ("EPA Denial"), that CAA does not grant EPA authority to
address global climate change; 163 and, that even if the agency could
establish greenhouse gas emission regulations, it would refuse to
exercise such authority. 164 EPA proffered numerous justifications
160. Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to
Marianne L. Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator (Aug. 28, 2003) [hereinafter
Fabricant Memorandum], available at http://www.icta.org/doc/FabricantMemo-
Aug282003.pdf. Interestingly, since the U.S. Supreme Court essentially over-
turned the findings of the Fabricant Memorandum (See Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct.
1438 (2007), which is discussed in more detail later in this Article), the memoran-
dum is no longer publicly available for download on the EPA website. However,
ICTA provides a copy of the Fabricant Memorandum on its website cited above.
161. Fabricant Memorandum, supra note 165, at n. 9. Fabricant notes that the
Cannon Memorandum "failed to address...the core of the definition, thereby ig-
noring traditional rules of statutory interpretation." Id.
162. Id. at 11-12. The cited case is Food and Drug Admin v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp. (FDA v. Brown), 120 S.Ct. 1291 (2000). Fabricant inter-
preted the U.S. Supreme Court decision, in the context of the ICTA petition,
would conclude "... that an administrative agency properly awaits congressional
direction on a fundamental policy issue such as global climate change, instead of
searching for new authority in an existing statute that was not designed or enacted
to deal with that issue." Id. at 4. In other words, Fabricant concluded that facially
broad statutory authority is limited by the statute's purpose, structure and history,
particularly when significant policy questions are involved.
163. EPA Denial, supra note 162, at 52,925-29.
164. Id. at 52929-31.
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for its conclusion that it lacks statutory authority to regulate green-
house gases, including that:
* "[T]he Agency had not made the requisite findings under any
CAA provision for regulation," 165 such as the threat of endangering
public health and welfare;
* The Supreme Court "cautions agencies against using broadly
worded statutory authority to regulate in areas raising unusually sig-
nificant economic and political issues when Congress has specifi-
cally addressed those areas in other statutes;" 166
• "Congress was well aware of the global climate change issue
when it.. .amended the CAA in 1990," but chose to further investi-
gate climate change rather than enacting automobile emission limita-
tions; 167 and,
* CAA only addresses only local air pollutants rather than sub-
stances concentrated throughout the global atmosphere. 168
Because of these justifications, EPA determined that greenhouse
gases cannot be air pollutants under CAA's regulatory provisions.' 
69
However, EPA also offered that, even if greenhouse gases were air
pollutants under CAA, the agency would refuse to regulate the gases
because doing would impede upon the jurisdiction of the Department
of Transportation in setting fuel economy standards. 170 EPA stated
165. Id. at 52925.
166. Id. (citing FDA v. Brown, 120 S.Ct. 1291). The EPA Denial further notes
that an agency should "be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in
which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such.. .magnitude to an
administrative agency." Id.
167. Id. at 52,926.
168. Id. at 52,927.
169. Id. at 52,928.
170. Id. at 52,929. At the time of EPA Denial, the Department of Transporta-
tion had never exercised its authority to increase fuel economy standards. The
current fuel economy standard for automobiles is 27.5 miles per gallon, 49 C.F.R.
§ 531.5(a), and has not changed since Congress enacted the provision in 1975.
Under the current rules, automakers must maintain an average of 21 miles per
gallon for SUVs, minivans and other light trucks. 49 C.F.R. § 533.5(a). In 2006,
the average fuel economy for all vehicles on the road in the United States was 25.4
miles per gallon. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, SUMMARY OF FUEL
ECONOMY PERFORMANCE (2006) http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf99/
426721 web.pdf (last accessed September 1, 2007). By way of comparison, the
four-cylinder Ford Model T, introduced in 1908, consumed fuel at around 13 to 21
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it would be premature to regulate where the NRC Report "cannot
unequivocally establish" a causal link between greenhouse gases and
the observed climate change, and where regulation would result in
"an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing the climate change
issue."'1 71 Finally, EPA did not want to interfere with the President's
comprehensive climate change program, nor his ability to negotiate
with foreign countries on global emissions.'
72
miles per gallon. Ford, Model T Facts, http://media.ford.com/article dis-
play.cfm?articleid=858 (last accessed June 1, 2008).
171. EPA Denial, supra note 162, at 52,930-31.
172. Id. at 52,931-32. EPA Petition credits the President's policy as seeking "to
reduce key uncertainties that exist in our understanding of global climate change"
by developing "public-private partnerships to develop break-through technologies
that could dramatically reduce the economy's reliance of fossil fuels" over the
course of many generations. Id. at 52930-31. Despite his fuel reduction policy,
President Bush tripled a federal tax code incentive in 2003 to provid.: a $75,000
tax deduction for the purchase of a gas-guzzling vehicle that weighs over 6,000
pounds. Congress increased the incentive by providing a $100,000 tax credit. See
I.R.C. § 179. For more information regarding President Bush's 2002 climate
change policy, see Armin Rosencranz, U.S. Climate Change Policy under G. W.
Bush, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 479 (2002). Further, the argument that EPA's
regulation would interfere with the President's ability to negotiate with foreign
countries is predicated upon the agency's proposition that "unilateral regulation of
U.S. motor vehicle emissions could weaken efforts to persuade developing coun-
tries to reduce the intensity of greenhouse gases thrown off by their economies."
EPA Petition, supra note 162, at 52,931. The EPA does not further expand upon
how the President would lose creditability in seeking to do so by setting an exam-
ple for these countries. Instead, EPA supports this proposition by arguing that the
"large populations and growing economies of some developing countries, in-
creases their [greenhouse gas] emissions [and would] quickly overwhelm the ef-
fects of [greenhouse gas] emission measures in developed countries." Id. There-
fore, the EPA's argument is essentially that the U.S. should not have to reduce
domestic emissions because other countries may emit more greenhouse gases in
the future. Based on this argument, EPA believes it would harm the President's
ability to convince these developing countries to reduce their emissions. However,
EPA failed to consider that reducing domestic emissions slows the global increase
of greenhouse gases regardless of international emissions.
[VOL. XIX
THE ROAD TO CLEAN AIR
IV. SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT EPA HAS AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE GREENHOUSE GASES PURSUANT TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT
AND THAT EPA's REFUSAL TO REGULATE IS INVALID
Following the denial of the ITCA Petition, twelve states, 173 several
local governments' 74 and private organizations 175 (collectively "Pe-
titioners") challenged the EPA's action in the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals. 176 A group of ten states 177 and some trade organizations 178
intervened as respondents to support the position of EPA (collec-
tively "Respondents"). Specifically, Petitioners sought the court's
review of the EPA's conclusion "that it did not have statutory au-
thority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles
and that, even if it did, it would not exercise the authority at this
time."1 7
9
A. Court of Appeals Upholds EPA 's Denial of Petition for Rule-
making
In reviewing the EPA's denial, the three justices of the Court of
Appeals each wrote separate opinions. Two justices concluded that
the EPA properly exercised its discretion in denying the ICTA peti-
tion for rulemaking, but for different reasons. Justice Randolph,
writing the opinion for the Court, focused on the provision of CAA
Section 202(a)(1) which directs the Administrator to regulate where
173. California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington.
174. District of Columbia, American Samoa, New York City, and Baltimore.
175. Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law
Foundation, Environmental Advocates, Environmental Defense, Friends of the
Earth, Greenpeace, International Center for Technology Assessment, National
Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of
Concerned Scientists, and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
176. Pursuant to CAA § 307(b)(1), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), the U.S.
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
appeals of "nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by
the Administrator" under CAA. Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415
F.3d 50, 53-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
177. Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, Texas and Utah.
178. Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, National Automobile Dealers As-
sociation, Engine Manufacturers Association, C02 Litigation Group and Utility
Air Regulatory Group.
179. Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d at 53 (citing EPA
Denial, supra note 162. at 52922).
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"in his judgment" the emissions "may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." 180 Justice Randolph relied on a
1976 Court of Appeals decision that provides the Administrator con-
siderable discretion in making threshold judgments regarding
whether to regulate pursuant to Section 202(a)(1).181 In concluding
that the Administrator's analysis was appropriate in weighing policy
considerations and scientific uncertainty, Justice Randolph stated
that a reviewing court "will uphold agency conclusions based on
policy judgments when an agency must resolve issues 'on the fron-
tier of scientific knowledge."' 1
82
Justice Sentelle wrote a separate opinion, concluding that Petition-
ers did not have standing because they failed to adequately show a
particularized harm to themselves beyond the global harm of climate
change suffered by the population at large. 183 Although he dissented
on the standing issue, Justice Sentelle joined Justice Randolph's
judgment on the merits of the case in order to deny the petition. 184
Consequently, the Court of Appeals ultimately held on July 15,
2005, "the EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion un-
der § 202(a)(1) in denying the petition for rulemaking."'' 85
Justice Tatel dissented entirely, concluding that Petitioners had
standing to bring their challenge to court and that CAA "clearly
gives EPA authority to regulate" greenhouse gas emissions.' 86 Jus-
180. Id. at 57-58.
181. Id. (citing Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.
1976) (en banc)).
182. Id. at 58 (citing Envtl. Def. Fund v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 598 F.2d 62
(D.C.Cir. 1978)).
183. Id. at 59-60. Justice Sentelle's opinion that petitioners lacked standing
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution relied upon Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the gov-
ernment action or inaction he challenges, [although] standing is not precluded, ... it
is ordinarily "substantially more difficult" to establish). Justice Sentelle offered
that "[t]he generalized public good that petitioners seek is the thing of legislatures
and presidents, not of courts. Id. at 60.
184. Id. at 60.
185. Id. at 58.
186. Id. at 62. Justice Tatel's opinion states that CAA "plainly authorizes regu-
lation of (1) any air pollutants emitted from motor vehicles that (2) in the Admin-
istrator's judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Id. at 67. In addition to this
exceeding broad language to plainly authorizes automobile greenhouse gas emis-
sion regulations, Justice Tatel cites CAA90, where "Congress expressly included
[carbon dioxide] in a partial list of 'air pollutants."' Id. After discrediting each of
the EPA's four arguments that CAA does not apply to carbon dioxide, Justice
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tice Tatel further summarized that CAA "gives the Administrator no
discretion to withhold regulation" for the policy considerations of-
fered by the EPA because "none of [the] policy reasons relate to the
statutory standard." 187  Once the Administrator is presented with
sufficient evidence to support an endangerment finding, the EPA has
no discretion and must regulate greenhouse gases. 188 Justice Tatel
criticized the EPA for misinterpreting its discretion to make endan-
germent findings as providing the agency discretion over policy con-
siderations. 189
B. Petitioners'Appeal to US. Supreme Court Seeking Regulation
After failing to persuade the Court of Appeals to reverse the EPA's
denial, 190 Petitioners' writ for certiorari was granted by the U.S. Su-
Tatel concludes "EPA has authority- indeed, the obligation- to regulate [green-
house gas] emissions from motor vehicles." Id. at 73.
187. Id. at 62. Considering the policy reasons offered by the EPA to justify its
decision not to regulate, Justice Tatel summarizes that "EPA has transformed the
limited discretion given to the Administrator under section 202- the discretion to
determine whether or not an air pollutant cause or contributes to pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare- into the
discretion to withhold regulation because it thinks such regulation bad policy." Id.
at 74. CAA only provides the EPA Administrator judgment to determine whether
the statutory standard for endangerment has been met. Id. at 75. EPA may only
withhold an endangerment finding in order to determine whether the statutory
requirement has been met. Id. at 76. Justice Tatel holds that none of EPA's prof-
fered reasons justify its refusal make the endangerment finding because they are
policy concerns, with have no connection to the statutory standard. Id. at 77.
188. Id. at 81.
189. Id. Justice Tatel is not alone in criticizing the EPA for overreaching its
authority by making policy considerations. In her amicus curiae brief to the Court
of Appeals, Former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, concluded the EPA
"possesses neither the mandate nor the expertise necessary to make foreign policy
judgments." Brief for Madeleine Albright as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Peti-
tioners, Massachusetts. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
31 2005). In reaching this conclusion, Ms. Albright points to the fact that Congress
did not delegate to the EPA any foreign policy considerations under the CAA, nor
can any implication be drawn that the agency has such authority, because Con-
gress delegated responsibility to global climate change policy directly to the De-
partment of State. Id. at 6. Ms. Albright further offers that, in her diplomatic ex-
perience as Secretary of State, domestic regulation of greenhouse gases "would
seem consistent with, not contrary to, the government's foreign policy on global
climate change." Id. at 16.
190. The Court of Appeals further denied Petitioner's petition for rehearing en
banc. 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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preme Court on June 26, 2006.191 In its appeal, Petitioners called
the EPA's decision "a significant mistake," arguing CAA Section
202(a)(1) is crystalline that the EPA must decide whether to regulate
automobile emissions based on whether there is a reasonably antici-
pated endangerment to public health or welfare, and not upon "tech-
nological judgments, international treaty negotiations, private-public
partnerships, or any other of the myriad factors EPA cited in decid-
ing not to regulate."' 92 By allowing EPA to import broad policy
factors into Section 202(a)(1), Petitioners argued that the appeals
court "sanctioned a large-scale and unwholesome shift of power
from Congress" completely out of step with Supreme Court prece-
dent. 193 Petitioners called on the Supreme Court to compel EPA to
act because the issue presented "goes to the heart of EPA's statutory
responsibilities to deal with the most pressing environmental prob-
lem of our time."'1 94 Petitioners claimed that without the Supreme
Court's aid, the lower court's decision would effectively place auto-
mobile greenhouse gas emissions beyond the EPA's regulatory reach
for an indefinite time and would allow the agency to disclaim its
191. 126 S.Ct. 2960 (2006).
192. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2006), 2006
WL 558353 [hereinafter Petitioner's Writ]. In deciding which factors the EPA
could consider in reaching its decision, Petitioners argued that the appeals court
dramatically departed from the Supreme Court's precedent by not first looking
elsewhere within the same statute before allowing policy considerations not men-
tioned in CAA § 202(a)(1). Id. at 13-14. Petitioners concluded this point by citing
that "[a]n administrative agency simply cannot rest its decisions on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider." Id. at 15 citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
193. Id. at 12-13. The precedent referred to is FDA v. Brown, which the EPA
interpreted in its denial of the ICTA petition as holding "...that an administrative
agency properly awaits congressional direction on a fundamental policy issue such
as global climate change, instead of searching for new authority in an existing
statute that was not designed or enacted to deal with that issue." 120 S. Ct. at
1294 (2000). Petitioners argued that EPA misinterpreted the case because central
to its holding was the fact that Congress and the FDA had a sixty-year understand-
ing that the FDA lacked authority to regulate tobacco products under the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act. Petitioners Writ at 19. If FDA did regulate tobacco
products, it would be forced to bad them. Id. Petitioners, here, argued that Con-
gress had never "enacted any legislation premised on EPA's 'no authority' inter-
pretation." Id. Further, regulation of greenhouse gases would not result in any
effective bans, it would only allow EPA to set technologically and economically
feasible standards for the air pollutants, something EPA has done for decades for
other tailpipe pollutants. Id. at. 20.
194. Id. at. 22.
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statutory role in determining the dangers posed by these pollutants
from any source. 1
95
Respondents' brief to the Supreme Court claimed that Petitioners
sought EPA "to embark on the extraordinarily complex and scien-
tifically uncertain task of addressing the global issue of greenhouse
gas emissions."' 96  Respondents asserted the Petitioners lacked
standing to bring the suit because they failed to establish causation
and redressability. 197  Additionally, Respondents claim review by
the Supreme Court is not required because the Court of Appeals cor-
rectly upheld EPA's exercise of its discretion not to make an endan-
germent finding. 198 Respondents claim EPA identified sensible and
appropriate reasons to conclude an endangerment finding is inappro-
priate given "the complex and highly uncertain nature of the scien-
tific record and the agency's desire to have the benefit of ongoing
research."'199 Further, Respondents claim that Petitioners inappro-
195. Id. at 24.
196. Brief for Respondent, Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2006) (No. 05-1120)
[hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
197. Id. at 11. Respondents cite Justice Tatel's dissent from the appeals court,
which concluded that the particularized injury in the suit is that of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, asserting "greenhouse gas emissions would lead to
global warming, which would cause rising sea levels, which would in turn lead
both to permanent loss of coastal land and to more frequent and severe storm surge
flooding events along the coast." Id. Thus, Respondents argue that Petitioners
must show more than general climate change would cause the alleged injury, they
must show that the EPA's denial of rulemaking petition will cause the injury. Id.
Further, Respondents claim that Petitioners must also demonstrate that EPA's
imposition of automobile greenhouse gas emission regulations would redress the
injury. Id. at 12. Respondents argue such regulations would not redress the injury
because a reduction in U.S. motor vehicle emissions alone would not be sufficient
to address the injuries caused by climate change. Id. at 13-14.
198. Id. at 16. To support the conclusion that EPA has broad discretion to make
an endangerment finding pursuant to CAA Section 202(a)(1), Respondents analo-
gize to "similar types of threshold regulatory determinations under similarly struc-
tured provisions of CAA," referring generally to various Circuit Court decisions
on other provisions of CAA. Id. at 16-17. Respondents bolster this conclusion by
offering that the D.C. Circuit has historically only overturned an agency's judg-
ment not to institute rulemaking in the rarest and most compelling circumstances.
Id. at 17-18.
199. Id. at 16. Respondents note that EPA properly relied upon the NRC Re-
port in concluding that a better decision could be made after an examination of
critical areas of current scientific uncertainty. Id. at 18-19. Respondents argue
that Petitioners are mistaken in interpreting CAA as precluding EPA from consid-
ering such scientific uncertainty in making an endangerment finding under Section
202(a)(1). Id. at 20-21. Interestingly, many of the scientists who wiote the NRC
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priately requested the Supreme Court to review EPA's conclusion
that it does not have authority to regulate automobile greenhouse gas
emissions in order to address global climate change because the
lower courts had not first addressed this legal question. 200 Finally,
Respondents argue that Petitioners erred in asserting the urgency of
global climate change because the federal government "is currently
undertaking to effectively and efficiently address the climate change
issue over the long term."
20 1
C. Supreme Court Reverses the Court of Appeals Decision
On April 2, 2007, in its most important environmental decision in
years, the U.S. Supreme Court held that EPA has the authority to
regulate automobile greenhouse gas emissions, and that the agency
would be required to do so unless it could provide a scientific basis
for its refusal.20 2 The court's decision can be separated into the fol-
lowing important holdings:
1. Massachusetts Has Standing to Sue Based upon Climate Change
With respect the EPA's first claim that Petitioners lacked standing
to file the suit, the Supreme Court first pointed to CAA Section
307(b)(1), where Congress expressly authorized citizen suits to chal-
Report petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that EPA and the Court of Appeals
ignored reasonable scientific certainty that greenhouse gas emissions had already
effect climate and will continue to perpetuate climate change in the future. Brief,
supra note 44.
200. Respondent's Brief, supra note 201, at 22. In Petitioner's reply brief, Peti-
tioners reference Justice Tatel's opinion as reviewing that important statutory
question, and which was not contested by the other justices on the panel. Brief of
Petitioners, Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438, No. 05-1120 (2006), 2006 WL
1491257.
201. Respondent's Brief, supra note 201, at 25. Petitioners note that, at the
time of the appeal to the Supreme Court, seven years had already passed since
EPA first received the petition for rulemaking, which EPA had squandered on the
issue for nearly a decade. Petitioner's Writ, supra note 197, at 25.
202. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say E.P.A. Has Power to Act on Harmful
Gases, New York Times, April 3, 3007. The decision represented a 5-to-4 split of
the court, with Justice John Paul Stevens writing the opinion of the majority,
joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen G. Breyer. Id. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., wrote the dissent-
ing opinion, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A.
Alito, Jr. Id. See, Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
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lenge EPA action. 203 The court also recognized the special position
of Massachusetts, as a quasi-Sovereign state, in seeking to protect all
the earth and air within its domain. 20 4  The court kept these two
standing considerations in mind while reviewing the scientific evi-
dence presented in the case. The court held that the state had suf-
fered an injury, which was supported by the EPA's own NRC Re-
port,20 5 and the remediation costs alone for rising sea levels in Mas-
sachusetts could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars.
20 6
203. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1453. The court cites CAA § 307(b)(1) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)). See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
204. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1454. The court reaches its conclusion that
Massachusetts has standing, as a state, because the state surrendered certain "sov-
ereign prerogatives" to enter the union. Id. These prerogatives, such as the right
to invade other states or to negotiate treaties with other nations to reduce green-
house gas emissions, were surrendered to the federal government. Id. Because
Congress ordered the EPA to protect Massachusetts, and the other states, from air
pollution which may, in the Administrator's judgment, reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare, and because Congress provided a procedural
right to challenge the EPA's rulemaking, Congress granted the quasi-sovereign
states special standing. Id. at 1454-55. Note that the dissenting opinion, written
by Chief Justice Roberts, which is joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and
Justice Alito, does not support the conclusion that the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts is entitled to special status in the court's standing analysis. Id at 1464.
("Relaxing Article III standing requirements because asserted injuries are pressed
by a State, however, has no basis in our jurisprudence, and support for any such
special solicitude is conspicuously absent from the Court's opinion.") The minor-
ity concludes that an alleged injury must be concrete and particularized, and must
seek relief that directly and tangibly benefits plaintiff in a manner distinct from the
public at large. Id. at 1467 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992)).
205. NRC REPORT, supra note 21. The Supreme Court cites "a number of envi-
ronmental changes that have already inflicted significant harms, including the
global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier
spring melting of rivers and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels
during the 20 th century relative to the past few thousand years." Mass. v. EPA,
127 S.Ct. at 1455 (citing NRC REPORT, supra note 21, at 16).
Note that the minority views the concept of loss of land due to a rise of sea levels
resulting from global climate change as inconsistent with the particularization
requirement for standing. Mass. v. EPA at 1467 (an alleged injury must be con-
crete and particularized). Specifically, the minority does not find that Petitioners
adequately supported its allegation of Massachusetts's actual loss of coastal land.
Mass. v. EPA at 1467. The minority also finds insurmountable problems in its
standing analysis with respect to Petitioner's elements of causation and redress-
ability. See Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1468-71.
206. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1456.
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Next, the court held that causation is clearly established by the sci-
entific evidence presented to the court.20 7 The court held that it is
sufficient to establish causation by the fact that Massachusetts' inju-
ries naturally flow from EPA's refusal to regulate such emissions.
20 8
But the majority opinion elaborated beyond that point and consid-
ered the significant impact upon global climate change caused by
domestic automobile greenhouse gas emissions.20 9
Finally, the court concluded the standing analysis by considering
redressability. The court determined that a remedy does exist, even
though the proposed regulation would not by itself reverse climate
change, because a reduction in domestic emissions would slow cli-
mate change regardless of what happens elsewhere in the world.210
The court concluded Petitioners had standing "because the rise in sea
levels associated with global warming has already harmed and will
continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk of catastrophic harm,
though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to
207. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1457. The court noted that even EPA does not
dispute the causal connection between greenhouse gas emissions and climate
change. Id. EPA had argued that domestic automobile emissions from new vehi-
cles contributed so insignificantly that the agency should not be forced to regulate
them to prevent the harm at issue. Id. Recall that the agency had also argued that
regulating automobile greenhouse gas emissions would result in a piecemeal ap-
proach to an important issue. EPA Denial, supra note 167, at 52.930-31. The
Supreme Court viewed this position as oversimplified and stated that EPA should
not be concerned with whether a regulation is a piecemeal approach because agen-
cies generally do not have the authority to resolve massive problems in one enact-
ment. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1457.
208. Id. Note that the minority found too speculative to establish causation the
loss of Massachusetts coastal land and the "fractional amount of global emissions
that might have been limited with EPA standards." Id. at 1469. The minority
supported the EPA's justification for denying the Petition for Rulemaking, which
concluded "predicting future climate change necessarily involves a complex web
of economic and physical factors...." Id.
209. Id. at 1457-58. The court cited the declaration of MacCracken, which
attributed six percent of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions to the United Stated
transportation sector, emitting more that 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide
in 1999 alone. Id. The court also cited the "National Greenhouse Gas Inventory
Data for the Period 1990-2004 and Status of Reporting 14" report prepared by the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2006, which offered
that, while the U.S. transportation sector emissions constitutes only one-third of
domestic carbon dioxide emissions, the United States would still rank as the third-
largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world even without the sector, outpaced by
only the European Union and China. Id.
210. Id. at 1458.
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some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek.",21' There-
fore, Petitioners had standing to bring the suit before the Supreme
Court.
2. Supreme Court Holds EPA Has Authority Pursuant to the Clean
Air Act to Regulate Automobile Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Before launching into the merits of the case, the Supreme Court es-
tablished that an administrative agency's denial of petition of rule-
making is subject to a limited and highly deferential standard of ju-
212dicial review. Yet, despite this level of review, the Supreme
Court concluded that EPA's denial of the petition for rulemaking
here was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law."
213
The majority opinion reached this finding by first offering that the
court has little trouble applying the CAA's sweeping definition of air
pollutant to include greenhouse gases that are emitted into the ambi-
ent air.214 The majority criticized EPA for overlooking the unambi-
guous statutory text and instead opting to interpret post-enactment
211. Id. at 1458.
212. Id. at 1459. The court distinguishes an agency's refusal to initiate rule-
making from the more-typical refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings. Id.
The court clarifies that refusals to initiate enforcement proceedings are generally
not subject to judicial review because an agency has broad discretion over how to
carry out its delegated responsibilities. Id. However, the court views refusals to
initiate rulemaking differently because they are "less frequent, more apt to involve
legal as opposed to factual analysis, and subject to special formalities, including a
public explanation." Id. at 1459 (citing American Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 814
F.2d 1, 4 (C.A.D.C. 1987)).
213. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1459 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7609(d)(9)). The
Court reversed both the EPA's determination "that it lacked authority under 42
U.S.C.§ 7521(a)(1) to regulate new vehicle emissions because carbon dioxide is
not an air pollutant as that term is defined in § 7602" and it conclusions that "even
if it possessed authority, it would decline to do so because regulations would con-
flict with other administrative priorities." Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1459.
214. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1459-60. The court emphasizes that Con-
gress's definition includes "any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,
including any physical, chemical... substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air...," which "embraces all airbome compounds of
whatever stripe." Id. at 1460 citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (emphasis included in
opinion). The majority opinion also references the dissent opinion, stating that
Justice Scalia "does not (and cannot) explain why Congress would define air pol-
lutant so carefully and so broadly, yet confer on EPA the authority to narrow that
definition whenever expedient." Id. at 1460, n.26.
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congressional actions, which never remotely suggested that Congress
meant to curtail EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases as air
pollutants. 215
The Supreme Court also held EPA had misinterpreted case law
when concluding it would be an unwholesome shift of power from
Congress for the agency to regulate automobile greenhouse gas
emissions without some congressional direction on the fundamental
policy issue of global climate change. 216 Finally, the Supreme Court
rejected EPA's argument that regulating greenhouse gases would
infringe upon the Department of Transportation's authority to set gas
mileage standards.217 In concluding that EPA has authority to regu-
late greenhouse gases pursuant to CAA's capacious definition of air
pollutants, the majority offered that although Congress may not have
appreciated that fossil fuel consumption would lead to climate
change when it enacted CAA, Congress did understand that the act
would remain effective through changing circumstances and scien-
tific developments only if it provided for some regulatory flexibil-
215. Id. at 1460. The court elaborates further that Congress's efforts to promote
interagency collaboration and research regarding climate change in no way con-
flicts with EPA's pre-existing mandate to regulate air pollutants that may endanger
the pubic health and welfare. Id. citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(1). Collaboration and
research further do not conflict with regulatory efforts, they complement such
efforts. Id. (referring to EPA's argument that the enactment of the Stratospheric
Ozone Protection Act in 1990 precluded EPA from regulating greenhouse gas
emissions as air pollutants.) Id. at 1460, FN29 referring to CAA90, codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671p (2000). See also Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1461 ("EPA
has not identified any congressional action that conflicts in any way with the regu-
lation of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles.")
216. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1461. Recall that EPA Denial cited FDA v.
Brown in concluding "...that an administrative agency properly awaits congres-
sional direction on a fundamental policy issue such as global climate change, in-
stead of searching for new authority in an existing statute that was not designed or
enacted to deal with that issue." The Supreme Court offered that in FDA v.
Brown, the FDA would be required to ban tobacco products pursuant to the statute
at issue, where EPA would instead only be required to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions under the Clean Air Act. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1461. Further, in
FDA v. Brown, congressional enactments had been based upon the understanding
that the FDA lacked authority to regulate tobacco products under the statute, but
congress has not enacted any legislation with the understanding that EPA lacked
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Id.
217. Id. at 1461-62. The majority opinion stated that it is possible for the two
agencies' obligations to overlap, but EPA cannot use the Department of Transpor-
tation's wholly independent authority to regulate mileage as a license to shirk its
own environmental responsibilities. Id. at 1462.
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ity. 218 The broad language of Section 202(a)(1) reflects the inten-
tional efforts of Congress "to confer the flexibility necessary to fore-
stall such obsolescence." 219  Thus, the majority of the Supreme
Court holds, EPA has authority pursuant to CAA to regulate auto-
mobile greenhouse gas emissions.22 °
3. Supreme Court Holds EPA Misinterpreted Its Discretionary Au-
thority Under the Clean Air Act to Make Endangerment Findings
In addition to holding that EPA has the authority to regulate auto-
mobile greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to CAA, the Supreme
Court also considered the agency's alternative justification for deny-
ing the ICTA Petition. EPA Denial had further concluded that even
if the agency had authority to regulate greenhouse gases, EPA
thought it would be unwise to do so at the time. 22 1 The majority of
the Supreme Court held that this reasoning is completely divorced
from the statutory framework of CAA.222
In reaching this holding, the majority concluded that EPA can
avoid taking action upon ICTA's petition for rulemaking only upon
its determination that greenhouse gases "do not contribute to climate
change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it
cannot or will not exercise its discretion" to determine whether the
air pollutant may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare. 223 In other words, the discretion provided to EPA to
make endangerment findings is not a roving license to ignore the
agency's responsibilities under CAA.224 If the EPA makes an en-
dangerment finding, the agency's discretion relates to the "manner,
timing, content, and coordination of its regulations. 225
The majority held that EPA refused to comply with the clear statu-
tory command and instead offered an invalid laundry list of reasons
226not to regulate. The majority offers that while it has neither the
218. Id. at 1462.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. EPA Denial, supra note 167, at 52,929-31.




226. Id. The court cites the EPA's reasoning that the executive branch already
had a number of voluntary programs as an effective response to climate change,
that regulating greenhouse gas emissions might impair the President's ability to
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expertise nor the authority to evaluate EPA's policy judgments, the
justifications offered by the agency for not making the scientific-
based endangerment finding have nothing to do with whether green-
house gas emissions contribute to climate change. For that reason,
the majority held that EPA avoided its statutory obligation in con-
cluding that it would be better not to regulate. The majority further
offers that, if scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes
the agency from making a reasoned judgment that greenhouse gases
contribute to climate change, EPA must say so. But if there is suffi-
cient scientific information to make an endangerment finding, EPA
cannot base its decision not to regulate upon its preference not to
because of some residual uncertainty, as it had done.227
4. What the Supreme Court's Holding in Massachusetts v. EPA
Means for EPA
In summary, the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision held that Petition-
ers had established an injury based on climate change sufficient to
sue, that greenhouse gases are air pollutants as defined by CAA, and
that EPA cannot decline to regulate such gases based on the various
policy considerations offered by the agency that were separate from
an endangerment finding regarding the threat posed by climate
change. 228 The majority opinion specified that the holding does not
address whether EPA must make an endangerment finding or
whether policy concerns can inform EPA action if it makes such a
finding.229 The majority opinion holds only that EPA must base its230
reasons for action or inaction upon CAA. This logically leaves
one to wonder what the court's holding means for EPA and for
automobile greenhouse gas emission regulations.
When the EPA is now faced with a petition for rulemaking, the
Supreme Court's holding provides three ways by which the Admin-
negotiate with developing countries to reduce their emissions, and that the pro-
posed regulation would result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to the climate
change issue. Id. at 1462-63.
227. Id. at 1463. The majority decision notes Justice Scalia's dissent the con-
trary. Id.
228. JONATHAN MARTEL, THE SUPREME COURT'S CLIMATE CHANGE DECISION
IN MASS. V. EPA: ROUNDTABLE WITH THE LITIGANTS AND DECISIONMAKERS, ALI-
ABA Telephone Seminar (May 18, 2007).
229. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1463, (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
230. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. at 1463.
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istrator may exercise judgment: (1) by concluding the pollutant
causes, or contributes to, air pollution that may reasonably be antici-
pated to endanger public health or welfare, thereby requiring EPA to
regulate the pollutant; (2) by concluding the pollutant does not
cause, or contribute to, air pollution that may reasonably be antici-
pated to endanger public health or welfare, thereby not requiring
EPA to regulate the pollutant; or, (3) by providing a reasonable ex-
planation why the agency cannot or will not exercise its discretion to
determine whether the pollutant causes, or contributes to, air pollu-
tion that may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare, in which case EPA is not required to regulate.23' The ma-
jority opinion further held that the policy-based explanation offered
by the agency thus far, pursuant to the third option above, is invalid
because the justifications were not based upon the scientific certainty
of whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate
232change.
In reviewing ICTA's Petition for Rulemaking on remand for the
Supreme Court's decision, EPA could clearly make an endanger-
ment finding and regulate automobile greenhouse gas emissions.
Given that the Supreme Court did not set a timetable for EPA action,
that there are not deadlines established in CAA, and that it ordinarily
takes several years for EPA to promulgate NAAQS, there is a good
change that the agency will take no definitive action during the Bush
Administration. 233
In order for EPA to avoid regulating automobile greenhouse gas
emissions, the agency must either find that greenhouse gases do not
cause or contribute to climate change, or the agency must provide a
reasonable explanation from CAA to justify its discretion for not
making such a funding. It is highly likely that further litigation
would follow either of these actions. 234 However, the Bush Admini-
231. Mass. v. EPA at 1472. The dissenting opinion written by Justice Scalia,
which is joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, criticizes
the majority for inventing the three-option formula and narrowing the Administra-
tor's "universe of potential reasonable [explanations for not exercising discretion]
to a single one: Judgment can be delayed only if the Administrator concludes that
the scientific uncertainty is too profound." Id. citing Mass. v. EPA at 1463 (em-
phasis added by minority opinion).
232. Mass. v. EPA at 1463.
233. MICHAEL B. GERRARD, U.S. Supreme Court Decides Massachusetts v.
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stration may change its position on regulating automobile green-
house gas emissions. The day after the Supreme Court's holding,
President Bush stated that he takes the opinion very seriously as the
new law of the land, offering that he recognizes that man is contrib-
uting greenhouse gases to the serious problem of climate change.235
One month later, President Bush again addressed the Supreme Court
ruling that EPA must take action when he signed an symbolic execu-
tive order requiring cooperation between EPA and the Department of
Transportation, Energy, and Agriculture "to protect the environment
with respect to greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.. .in a
manner consistent with sound science, analysis of benefits and costs,
public safety, and economic growth.,
236
V. CALIFORNIA'S AUTHORITY UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT TO
INDEPENDENTLY REGULATE AUTOMOBILE GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS PURSUANT TO ASSEMBLY BILL 1493
Regardless of whether EPA finds a valid statute-based justification
for not regulating automobile greenhouse gas emissions, California
retains unique authority under CAA to independently regulate auto-
mobile emissions. In accordance with this authority, California en-
acted Assembly Bill 1493 in 2002, authorizing the first regulation of
automobile greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, before California can
235. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the Emergency Supplemental
(April 3, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/
04/20070403.html.
236. Exec. Order 13432, 72 Fed. Reg. 27,717 (May 14, 2007). See also Press
Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Office of the President, President
Bush Discusses CAFE and Alternative Fuel Standards (May 14, 2007) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/print/2007/20070514-4.html.
Despite these public pledges, the President has urged against "anything other than
a voluntary approach to curbing emissions, saying regulations could undercut eco-
nomic activity," and also stated that he will "accept no global deal on greenhouse
gases without the participation of China, India and other high-polluting, develop-
ing nations." Associated Press, Bush orders rules meant to combat greenhouse
gases, CNN.coM, May 14, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/05/14/
bush.greenhouse.gases.ap/index/html. Environmental groups have criticized the
President's position, noting that the President continues to push for meetings and
additional studies rather than actually setting tangible greenhouse gas emission
standards. Associated Press, Bush urges 15 nations to set global emissions goal,
CNN.coM, May 31, 2007, available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/ POLITICS/
05/3 1/bush.climate.ap/index.html.
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utilize its unique authority to regulate automobile emissions, the
state must obtain a waiver from EPA. As discussed in detail above,
EPA has proven resistant to regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
This Part IV discusses AB 1493, the CARB regulations enacted in
response to AB 1493, and California's waiver process before EPA.
A. California Assembly Bill 1493 - Vehicular Emissions: Green-
house Gases
Seeking to affirm California's long history of being the first in the
nation to take action to protect public health and the environment, 23
7
the California Assembly enacted Bill 1493 on July 1, 2002, which
was signed into law by then-Governor Gray Davis on July 22,
2002.238 AB 1493 directed the California Air Resources Board
("CARB") to adopt regulations "that achieve the maximum feasible
and cost effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles.,
239
Along with the broad discretion granted to CARB to these regula-
tions, however, came explicit limitations. 240 In developing the stan-
dards, CARB was instructed to consider the technological feasibility
of the regulations and the impact the regulations may have on the
state economy, including the impact upon jobs, businesses, and
237. Legislative Findings, AB 1493, Pavely, Vehicular emissions: greenhouse
gases, Section l(f), Stats.2002, c. 200 (A.B. 1493), 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 200
§3(d) (West), codified as Cal. Health & Safety Code § 43018.5 (West 2007). Re-
call that California adopted the first automobile emissions control program in
1960. See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 81.
238. AB 1493 is codified as Cal. Health & Safety Code § 43018.5 (West 2007).
The bill was originally proposed as AB 1058, which passed the California Assem-
bly by the razor-thin margin of 42-24 votes on January 30, 2002. Rachel L. Chan-
nin, California's Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 699, 706 (2003). Although the bill was approved
by the California Senate, the Senate later revised the bill in light of political oppo-
sition and an aggressive campaign against the bill by the automobile industry. Id.
The revised bill, now identified as AB 1493, narrowly passed the assembly, ob-
taining the minimum 41 votes required, with 30 representatives voting against the
bill and 9 not voting. State of California Legislative Counsel, Complete Bill His-
tory, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_1451-1500/
ab_1493 bill 20020722 history.html (last accessed September 1, 2007).
239. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2007).
240. The limitations may have been added in response to criticisms of earlier
versions of the bill. Channin, supra note 243, at 706.
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241
automobile workers within the state. CARB was also explicitly
precluded from imposing additional fees or taxes on any vehicle,
fuel or miles traveled; banning the sale of any vehicle category, such
as sport utility vehicles; mandating a reduction in vehicle weight;
lowering speed limits; or limiting vehicle miles traveled.242 AB
1493 further set forth several procedural requirements, 243 prohibited
the regulations from taking effect prior to January 1, 2006, and lim-
ited application to motor vehicles manufactured for the 2009 model
244year or later. Finally, AB 1493 allowed CARB to instead adopt
any federal greenhouse gas emissions standards that may be adopted,
so long as the federal regulations provide a similar timeframe and
equivalent or greater effectiveness.
245
241. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(c) (West), which provides the
following:
In developing regulations described in subdivision (a), the state
board shall do all of the following: (1) Consider the technological
feasibility of the regulations. (2) Consider the impact the regulations
may have on the economy of the state, including, but not limited to,
all of the following areas: (A) The creation of jobs within the state.
(B) The creation of new businesses or the elimination of exiting busi-
nesses within the state. (C) The expansion of businesses current do-
ing business within the state. (D) The ability of businesses in the
state to compete with businesses in other states. (E) The ability of the
state to maintain and attract businesses in communities with the most
significant exposure to air contaminates, localized air contaminants,
or both, including, but not limited to, communities with minority
populations or low-income populations, or both. (F) The automobile
workers and affiliated businesses in the state.
242. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 200 §3(d) (West), codified as CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(d) (West 2007).
243. AB 1493 required CARB to conduct public workshops in the state, includ-
ing public workshops in three communities with the most significant exposure to
air contaminates, with minority populations, or low-income populations. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(c)(4) (West 2007). CARB was also instructed
to grant emissions credits for greenhouse gas emission reductions achieved before
the regulations were implemented, with model year 2000 used as a the baseline.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(c)(5) (West 2007). Finally, the CARB
regulations are to provide an exemption for vehicles subject to the low-emission
vehicle standard for nitrogen oxide emissions. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
43018.5(e) (West 2007).
244. Id. at § 43018.5(b)(1) (West 2007).
245. Id. at § 43018.5(h) (West 2007).
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With these considerations in mind, CARB approved its automobile
greenhouse gas emission regulations on September 23, 2004.246 The
regulations set emission standards for carbon dioxide, methane, ni-
trous oxide and hydrofluorocarbon. 247 During the near-term regula-
tory period, years 2009 through 2012, the standards will result in an
approximately twenty-two percent reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions, and the mid-term standards, years 2013 through 2016,
will result in about a thirty percent reduction. 248 In California alone,
CARB estimates that the standards will reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions by approximately thirty million metric tons per year in 2020,
and over fifty million metric tons per year in 2030. 249 This equates
to an overall eighteen percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions
from passenger vehicles in California in 2020, and a twenty-seven
percent reduction in 2030.250
Because other states are able to adopt the California regulations, 2 51
the resulting reduction of climate change causing greenhouse gases
may be more significant. Eleven states have already adopted Cali-
fornia's automobile greenhouse gas emissions standards, and six
additional states are actively considering adopting the standards.252
246. California Air Resources Board (CARB), Resolution 14-28, (Sept. 23,
2004) http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/grnhsgas/res0428.pdf. The regulations were
approved by the California Office of Administrative Law and filed with the Secre-
tary of State on September 15, 2005. 39-Z Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 1427-28
(Aug. 4, 2005). The regulations became operative on January 1, 2006, and are
codified at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 1961.1 (2007).
247. CARB, Fact Sheet: Climate Change Emission Control Regulations, De-
cember 10, 2004, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/ccms.htm. The regulations limit
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide directly emitted from operation of the
vehicle. Id. The regulations also seek to eliminate the emission of carbon dioxide
from automobile air conditioning systems. Id. Further, the regulations will reduce
the emission of hydrofluorocarbon from air conditioning systems due to leakage,
losses during recharging, or release when the vehicle is scrapped at the end of its
life. Id. These regulations will complement existing efforts to reduce upstream
emissions by setting standards for production of the fuel used by the vehicle. Id.
'248. Id.
249. CARB, Climate Change Emissions Standards for Vehicles, Frequently
Asked Questions, May 30, 2007, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/
ccms.htm.
250. Id.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 7507, See supra note 125.
252. CARB, Climate Change Emissions Standards for Vehicles, Frequently
Asked Questions, May 30, 2007, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/ccms.htm. The
eleven states, which have adopted the standards, are: Connecticut, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
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The total reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 resulting
from all the states which have already adopted California's standards
will be seventy-four million metric tons per year, and the total reduc-
tion would be one hundred metric tons per year if the additional six
states adopt California's standards. 253 By 2020, 392 metric tons of
greenhouse gas emissions will have been eliminated, the equivalent
254of taking seventy-four million cars off the road for an entire year.
B. The Clean Air Act Establishes The California Waiver Process
Before California's automobile greenhouse gas emissions stan-
dards may go into effect, California must first obtain a waiver from
EPA.255 CAA Section 209(b)(1) clearly establishes the requirement
that the EPA Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for
public hearing, waive the application of the federal preemption pro-
vision. 256 Since 1967, CAA presumes California is entitled to the
waiver and places the burden of proof upon the party opposing the
waiver to prove the more stringent standards are not required.257 In
other words, EPA must grant California's waiver unless the federal
agency makes one of three findings: that (1) California's deternina-
tion that its regulatory program is at least as protective as the federal
program is arbitrary and capricious; (2) California does not need
separate standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions;
or (3) California's standards are not consistent with CAA Section
202(a), which provides automobile manufacturers lead time to im-
plement and test for compliance with the standards.
2 58
Vermont and Washington. Id. The six states actively considering the standards
are: Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Mexico and North Caro-
lina. Id.
253. Id.
254. Arnold Schwarzenegger & Jodi Rell, Editorial, Lead or Step Aside, EPA,
WASH. POST, May 21, 2007 at A-13.
255. Recall that CAA preempts states from adopting independent motor vehicle
emission standards, except the act provides California a waiver of federal preemp-
tion because the state had been regulating automobile emissions prior to the en-
actment of the federal regulatory scheme. CAA67 § 208(a), supra note 82.
256. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (1994).
257. Recall that Senator George Murphy of California, against opposition by
Congressman John Dingell of Detroit, successfully campaigned for the presump-
tion in California's favor during the 1967 Amendment to CAA. Chanin, supra
note 97.
258. 42 U.S.C § 7543(b). The waiver provision reads:
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In addition to a presumption in favor of the California waiver and
limited enumerated instances when EPA may find against granting
the waiver, EPA and the courts have consistently provided minimal
oversight over California's emissions standards.2' 9 Further, Con-
gress made clear its intent to grant California the widest possible
(1) The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for hearing,
waive application of this section to any State which has adopted
standards (other than crankcase emission standards) for the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines
prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines that the State stan-
dards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health
and welfare as applicable Federal standards. No such waiver shall be
granted if the Administrator finds that -- (A) the determination of the
State is arbitrary and capricious, (B) such State does not need such
State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or
(C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures
are not consistent with [Section 202(a)].
Id. Section 202(a) provides that the California standards must provide automobile
manufacturers with adequate lead time to permit the development of the necessary
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within that
time period, and must impose consistent certification procedures with federal pro-
cedures. EPA, California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Re-
quest for Waiver of Federal Preemption; Opportunity for Public Hearing, Notice
of Opportunity for Public Hearing and Comment, April 30, 2007, 72 F.R. 21260,
also available as 2007 WL 1234756.
259. Christopher T. Giovinazzo, California's Global Warming Bill: Will Fuel
Economy Preemption Curb California's Air Pollution Leadership, 30 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 893, 903 (2003). EPA has, for example, interpreted the "compelling and
extraordinary conditions" requirement as referring to the general topographical
conditions of the state and its large vehicle population, making it almost impossi-
ble to refute that such conditions exist. Id. (citing California State Motor Vehicle
Pollution Control Standards; Waiver of Federal Preemption Notice of Decision, 49
Fed. Reg. 18,887, 18,890 (May 3, 1984)). Further, EPA Administrator William D.
Ruckleshaus stated in a 1971 decision:
The law makes it clear that the waiver request cannot be denied
unless the specific findings designated in the statute can properly be
made. The issue of whether a proposed California requirement is
likely to result in only marginal improvement in air quality not com-
mensurate with its cost or is otherwise an arguably unwise exercise
of its regulatory power is not legally pertinent to my decision under
section 209.
36 Fed. Reg. 17,158 (August 31, 1971). This interpretation of the statute is consis-
tent with the decision in Motor & Equip. Mfrs Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency.,
627 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Circuit 1979) (once California determines its standards are,
in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable
federal standards, the Administrator must grant the authorization request unless
one of the three specified findings can be made).
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latitude, requiring "clear and compelling evidence that the State
acted unreasonably in evaluating the relative risks of various pollut-
ants in light of the air quality, topography, photochemistry, and cli-
mate in the State, before EPA may deny a waiver." 260 Because of
this, EPA has granted approximately fifty new waiver requests, and
about forty determinations that amendments were within the scope
261of prior waivers, since 1968.21 Only five waiver requests have ever
been denied, the most recent denial was in 1975.262
CARB first requested that EPA grant a waiver of federal preemp-
tion to California for its automobile greenhouse gas emissions regu-
lations in December 2005. 263 Following inaction by EPA, California
Governor Schwarzenegger sent letters to President Bush in April
2006 and October 2006, urging the President to assist with the im-
mediate approval of California's waiver request. 264 Finally in April
2007, after Governor Schwarzenegger met with EPA Administrator
Stephen Johnson to personally request assistance and the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled in Massachusetts v. EPA that EPA must take ac-
tion on greenhouse gas emissions, EPA finally announced two pub-
lic hearins scheduled for May 2007 to consider California's waiver
request.2 W
260. Giovinazzo, California's Global Warming Bill at 903 (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 95-294, at 302 (1977), as reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1381).
261. CARB, Climate Change Emissions Standards for Vehicles, Frequently
Asked Questions, May 30, 2007, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/ccms.htm.
262. Id.
263. Letter from Catherine Witherspoon, Executive Officer of CARB, to
Stephen Johnson, Administrator of U.S. EPA, (Dec. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/ccms.htm.
264. Letters from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California, to George
W. Bush, President of the United States, (Apr. 10, 2006 & Oct. 24, 2006) avail-
able at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/6665/.
265. CARB, Climate Change Emissions Standards for Vehicles, Frequently
Asked Questions, May 30, 2007, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/ccms.htm. The
first hearing was held on May 22, 2007 at the U.S. EPA's Potomac Yard Confer-
ence Center in Arlington, Virginia, and the second hearing was held at the Califor-
nia Environmental Protection Agency's Headquarters in Sacramento, California,
on May 30, 2007. CARB, Climate Change Program for Mobile Sources,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/ccms.htm#Workshops (last accessed September 1,
2007).
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1. California Argues Proper Application of the Clean Air Act Pre-
emption Waiver Provision Requires EPA to Grant Waiver Request
to Regulate Automobile Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Although CAA establishes a presumption is in favor of granting
California the waiver, and requires any opposing party to prove one
of the three findings established above, California's waiver request
package submitted to EPA included substantial supporting docu-
ments. CARB first asserted that California's determination that its
regulatory scheme is at least as protective as the federal program is
not arbitrary or capricious because EPA has declined to set federal
standards for greenhouse gases, therefore the California regulations
are unquestionably at least as protective as the non-existent federal
regulations. 266
Next, CARB argued its automobile emissions program is neces-
sary to meet compelling and extraordinary circumstances in the state,
namely the serious air pollution problems unique to California.
CARB notes that EPA Administrators have consistently recognized
California's unique need for its own emission control program when
granting waivers based upon the state's geographic and climatic
conditions and high concentrations of automobiles, rather than
whether any given standard is necessary to meet the air pollution
conditions.267 This point is important because it undermines any
266. Letter from Catherine Witherspoon, Executive Officer, CARB, to Stephen
L. Johnson, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Administrator, Attachment 2, (Dec. 21,
2005), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/docs/waiver.pdf. [hereinafter CARB
Support Document] Interestingly, in finding whether CARB's determination that
California's regulations are at least as protective as EPA's regulations, EPA is
only able to compare California's regulations to EPA-promulgated standards. Id.
Thus, if the Department of Transportation were to set fuel economy standards
which resulted in more stringent automobile carbon dioxide emission standards
than the proposed California regulations, EPA would be precluded from consider-
ing those regulations in finding that California's regulations are more stringent.
Id.
267. Id. (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 18,887, 18,890, 41 Fed. Reg. 44,209, 44,213-15
(October 7, 1976) (The Administrator has recognized that even if such a standard
by standard test were applied to California, it "would not be applicable to its full-
est stringency due to the degree of discretion given to California in dealing with its
mobile source pollution problems)). CARB further states "longstanding federal
waiver law and practice makes clear that in reviewing California's waiver re-
quests, U.S. EPA is not to micro-manage each California standard for each pollut-
ant regulated in its mobile source programs." CARB Support Document, supra
note 271 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 4166 (January 13, 1993)).
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opposing argument that the greenhouse gas emissions regulations do
not address compelling and extraordinary circumstances in the state
because climate change is a global threat, rather than an issue unique
to California.268
Finally, CARB stated that its regulations are consistent with CAA
Section 202(a) because the regulations provide automobile manufac-
turers adequate lead time to permit the development of technology to
meet the requirements and because the California test procedures are
adequately consistent with the federal procedures. 269  Therefore,
CARB concluded that EPA must waive federal preemption for Cali-
fornia's automobile greenhouse gas emissions regulations because
there is no basis for EPA to make any of the three enumerated find-
ings required for denying the state's waiver request.
2. Automobile Manufacturers Opposition and EPA's Anticipated
Denial of California's Waiver Request
During EPA's waiver request hearings, sole opposition to Califor-
nia's waiver request came from the Alliance of Automobile Manu-
facturers.270 The automobile manufacturers protested that "there
268. The CARB waiver request assumes the automobile manufacturers will
make this argument, and therefore preemptively argues compelling and extraordi-
nary circumstances exist, citing the effects of climate change that the state has and
will suffer "due solely to global warming from greenhouse gas emissions." CARB
Support Document, supra note 271.
269. CARB Support Document, supra note 271. While the consistency re-
quirements of Section 202(a) are beyond the scope of this Article, a summary of
CARB's argument that the requirements are met is based on its conclusion that
automobile greenhouse gas emission reduction technology already exists to com-
ply with the California regulations. Id. For example, CARB staff suggests the use
of engine valve train modifications, such as valve lift and cam phasing; turbo-
charging engines while downsizing overall horsepower; reconfiguring gear shift-
ing, such as increasing the number of gears in manual and automatic transmis-
sions, or applying more aggressive shift logic and early torque converter lockup on
automatic transmissions; implementing camless valve actuation systems; directly
injecting fuel; reducing engine friction; improving aerodynamic drag and roll re-
sistance; or using other engine-based technologies, such as hybrid or diesel en-
gines. Id. See also California Environmental Protection Agency, Air Resources
Board, Staff Proposal Regarding the Maximum Feasible and Cost-Effective Re-
duction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles, Draft, June 14, 2004,
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccms/ccms.htm.
270. Erica Werner, California Urges EPA to Approve Waiver, WASH. POST,
May 22, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/22/AR2007052200305_pf.html. The Alliance of
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needs to be a national, federal and multi-sector approach to regulat-
ing greenhouse gases," 271 claiming that the state's waiver request
contains many assumptions and undocumented claims. 272  Further,
the manufacturers argued against California's authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles because the state cannot
not prove a link between the global problem of climate change and
carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles in the state, further
arguing that piecemeal state-level regulations are not the way to
solve the problem.273
Despite EPA's formal waiver request process, supporters of the
regulations believe the decision will ultimately come from the White
274House. During the waiver hearing, California Attorney General
Jerry Brown called upon the EPA Administrator to grant the waiver
request, acknowledging that President Bush and Vice President Che-
ney are oil men under tremendous influence of the oil industry in
opposing California's regulations. 275 While EPA has declined to say
how, or when, it will act on the waiver request, 276 it is likely that the
agency will delay in issuing its final decision. This has prompted
California to act more aggressively.
Following nearly eighteen months of federal inaction since first
California filed its waiver request, Governor Schwarzenegger pro-
vided EPA 180-day notice of intent to sue for administrative delay
Automobile Manufacturers is a trade association of nine car and light truck manu-
facturers including BMW Group, Daimler-Chrysler, Ford Motor Company, Gen-
eral Motors, Mazda, Mitsubishi Motors, Porsche, Toyota and Volkswagen of
America, Inc. Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, About the Alliance, avail-
able at: http://www.autoalliance.org/about/.
271. Samantha Young, California urges EPA to Approve Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Waiver, MERCURY NEWS (San Jose), May 21, 2007.
272. Erica Werner, States Urge EPA to Approve Calif Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions Waiver, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 22, 2007.
273. Joel Havemann & Johanna Neuman, California urges EPA to Change
Greenhouse Gas Rules, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2007. Robert F. Sawyer, Chairman
of CARB, responded, outside of the hearing room, that "[w]e'd be delighted if
someone at the national level would institute a program like ours," but the Bush
Administration has adopted a wait-and-see policy as an excuse to do nothing,
which is unacceptable to California. Id.
274. Sholnn Freeman, Battle Heats Up Over Emissions, WASH. POST, May 23,
2007 at D-02.
275. Werner, States Urge EPA to Approve Calif Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Waiver, supra note 277.
276. Id.
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on April 26, 2007.277 By later announcing EPA's intent to not act
upon California's waiver request until late 2008, Schwarzenegger
has warned EPA Administrator Johnson that the agency will inevita-
bly find itself in court again over automobile greenhouse gas emis-
sion regulations. 278 Governor Schwarzenegger, and Governor Jodi
Rell of Connecticut, have stated "[i]t's bad enough that the federal
government has yet to take the threat of global warming seriously,
but it borders on malfeasance for it to block the efforts of states such
as California and Connecticut that are trying to protect the public
health and welfare. 279  While uncertainty surrounds California's
waiver request, one date remains certain in the escalating political
battle over automobile greenhouse gas emissions regulations - that
the 18 1st day from California's notice of intent to sue falls on Octo-
ber 24, 2007.
VI. EPA SHOULD NOT ONLY GRANT CALIFORNIA'S WAIVER
REQUEST, BUT SHOULD IMPLEMENT NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSION STANDARDS PURSUANT TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT TO
REDUCE THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
The Summer of 2007 marks a difficult time for EPA. As the
agency responsible for safeguarding the health and welfare of the
American public, 280 EPA has found itself compelled to regulate
automobile greenhouse gas emissions in an effort to lessen the po-
tentially catastrophic impacts threatened by global climate change.
Despite its desire for more time to investigate the role of greenhouse
gases in causing climate change,28' the clock is ticking for the
agency to act.
277. Press Release, Office of the Governor of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger
Warns U.S. EPA of California's Intent to Sue if Federal Government Fails to Act
on Waiver to Reduce Emissions (Apr. 25, 2007), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/603 1/.
278. Press Release, Office of the Governor of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger
Tells U.S. EPA of Inevitable Lawsuit on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Waiver (June
13, 2007), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/6665/.
279. Schwarzenegger & Rell, supra note 259.
280. Lewis, supra note 101.
281. See e.g., EPA Denial, supra note 167, at 52,925 (the agency had not made
the requisite findings under any CAA provision for regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions, such as the threat of endangering public health and welfare).
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EPA must again answer the ICTA Petition for Rulemaking, which
requests that the agency exercise its authority under CAA by regulat-
ing automobile greenhouse gas emissions. EPA previously denied
the ICTA Petition, arguing that the agency did not have authority to
regulate automobile greenhouse gas emissions and, even if it did, the
agency would not do so given the scientific uncertainty surrounding
the global issue of climate change, and because regulating the emis-
sions would both infringe upon the authority of the Department of
Transportation to regulate automobile fuel economy standards and
would impede the President in forming international emissions
agreements. However, the United States Supreme Court disagreed
with EPA's justifications for denying the ICTA Petition. In remand-
ing the ICTA Petition to EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
EPA does have authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under
CAA and that the policy justifications offered thus far by the agency
for not regulating are invalid.
Now EPA must decide either to regulate automobile greenhouse
gas emissions as requested or come up with a valid justification for
not regulating the emissions. The U.S. Supreme Court warned EPA
that the refusal to regulate must be grounded in CAA, such as pro-
found scientific uncertainty of whether greenhouse gases cause or
contribute to climate change. Yet, the scientific understanding of the
causes and potential impacts of climate change is more developed
now than the last time EPA reviewed the ICTA Petition. To make
the agency's decision more difficult, President Bush has provided
EPA with a mixed message. The President has clearly stated that he
is opposed to any involuntary greenhouse gas emissions standards.
However, he also issued an executive order requiring EPA to work
with the Department of Transportation in developing a cooperative
regulatory scheme to cut gasoline consumption and greenhouse gas
emissions from automobiles.282
EPA is concurrently faced with California's request for a waiver of
federal preemption in order for the state to independently regulate
automobile greenhouse gas emissions. In reaching a decision on the
waiver request, the agency must again consider the President's con-
flicting guidance on the issue. However, by not acting swiftly on
California's request, EPA has not only implied that it does not intend
282. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, President Bush Discusses CAFE and Alternative Fuel Standards, supra note
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to grant the waiver, but the agency has also subjected itself to the
aggressive political tactics of a state committed to protecting its en-
vironment and its authority to independently regulate automobile
283emissions.   Should the agency continue to delay the waiver re-
quest, Governor Schwarzenegger will force EPA to again justify its
inaction in the federal court system, where the Supreme Court has
recently held the agency was required to take action on the same
issue of automobile greenhouse gas emissions regulations.
Fortunately for EPA, the solution to the automobile greenhouse
gas emissions conundrum is simpler than the problem. First, EPA
should follow the agency's own precedent by granting California the
requested waiver of federal preemption, allowing the state to imple-
ment CARB's automobile greenhouse gas emissions regulations. A
mere cursory review of the waiver provision of CAA would support
EPA's approval of the request because CAA presumes California is
entitled to the waiver.28 4 Further, EPA and the courts have inter-
preted the waiver provision as granting California nearly unbridled
authority to independently regulate automobile emissions. 285 Thus,
EPA's decision to grant California's waiver request would be well
supported by legal authority.
In addition to providing the legal authority for EPA to grant the
waiver request, CAA also provides the limited circumstances by
which EPA may deny California's waiver request. 216 Any party op-
283. "Californians now ranks global warming as more important than at any
time since we first started asking about it in June of 2000," stated Mark Baldas-
sare, Survey Director of the Public Policy Institute of California. "They are so
concerned that two-thirds actually want the state to address this issue - completely
independent of the federal government. PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., PPIC
STATEWIDE SURVEY: SURVEY ON THE ENVIRONMENT, at v (2006), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/survey/S_706MBS.pdf. As much as 77% of
Californians are in favor of state law requiring automobile manufacturers to reduce
the emissions of greenhouse gases from new cars in California beginning in 2009,
and support for this measure has remained steady since June 2002. PUB. POLICY
INST. OF CAL., PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY: SPECIAL SURVEY ON THE
ENVIRONMENT, at v (2005), available at, http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/sur-
vey/S_705MBS.pdf. Further, 69% of Californians support the greenhouse gas
emission targets established by Governor Schwarzenegger, which would reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from cars, power plants, and industry by more than 80%
over the next 50 years. Id. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of
Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (2007).
284. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (1994).
285. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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posing the regulations has the heavy burden of disproving the pre-
sumption. Congress made clear its intent to grant California the
widest possible latitude, requiring "clear and compelling evidence
that the State acted unreasonably in evaluating the relative risks of
various pollutants.. .before EPA may deny a waiver., 2 87 In opposing
California's waiver request, the automobile industry has merely ech-
oed EPA's justifications for denying the ICTA Petition that a na-
tional, multi-sector approach to greenhouse gas regulations is needed
and that California had failed to prove a link between the global
problem of climate change and carbon dioxide emissions from motor
288
vehicles in the state. 8 These arguments are unpersuasive in light of
the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that EPA's justifications for deny-
ing the ICTA Petition were invalid.289 Further, the argument that
California does not need the regulations in order to meet compelling
and extraordinary conditions holds little merit considering that EPA
has interpreted the "compelling and extraordinary conditions" re-
quirement as referring to the general topographical conditions of the
state and its large vehicle population, making it almost impossible to
refute that such conditions exist.290 Therefore, because opponents of
the California waiver request have failed to disprove the presump-
tion in favor of granting the state's request, EPA would be com-
pletely justified in granting the state a waiver to implement its auto-
mobile greenhouse gas emissions regulations.
By granting California's waiver request, the agency would then be
relieved of having to defend its inaction in federal court against the
suit threatened by Governor Schwarzenegger. Consistent with Con-
gressional intent for California to act as a laboratory for innova-
tion,291 EPA could then observe the implementation and results of
the state's greenhouse gas emissions regulations. Based on these
observations, EPA could later adopt California's standards or im-
plement its own regulations, and would be able to better address the
ICTA Petition for Rulemaking.
In responding to the ICTA Petition, EPA should carefully consider
the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts v. EPA. The court
held that EPA undisputedly has authority to regulate greenhouse
gases as air pollutants pursuant to the agency's authority under
287. See supra note 260.
288. See supra notes 271, 272 and 273.
289. See Mass. v. EPA
290. See supra note 259.
291. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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292CAA. The court also offered that, in order for EPA to avoid regu-
lating greenhouse gases, the agency must base its rationale for doing
so upon CAA, 2 93 considering the scientific certainty of whether
greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change.294 When
EPA denied the ICTA Petition in 2003, the agency concluded cur-
rent scientific understanding does not unequivocally establish a
causal link between greenhouse gases and climate change. 295 How-
ever, the Supreme Court determined that the NRC Report used by
EPA does support a scientific causal link.296  The recent IPCC
Fourth Assessment Report, representing worldwide scientific con-
sensus, further supports a scientific conclusion that human-induced
greenhouse gas emissions are affecting climate change.
297
Rather than seeking to find documentation which is against current
international scientific consensus, EPA should acknowledge the role
of greenhouse gas emissions in climate change and grant the ICTA
Petition for Rulemaking. After granting the petition, EPA is not un-
der any specific timetable to adopt the automobile greenhouse gas
298
emissions regulations. Therefore, EPA could observe California's
implementation of the CARB regulations and work with the De-
partment of Transportation to develop federal regulations pursuant to
the President's Executive Order.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite developing scientific certainty that human-induced green-
house gas emissions are causing potentially catastrophic climate
change, the U.S. EPA has not acted to protect the health and welfare
of Americans. In the face of growing public support for greenhouse
gas regulations, the U.S. EPA denied a petition for rulemaking. Fol-
lowing this federal inaction, state and local governments have
adopted legislation to address the global issue of climate change.
California took a leadership role in reducing greenhouse gases in
2002 by enacting AB 1493, the nation's first automobile greenhouse
292. See Mass. v. EPA at 1459-60.
293. Seeld. at 1463.
294. Seeld. at 1463.
295. See EPA Denial, supra note 162, at 52,930-3 1.
296. See Mass. v. EPA at 1455.
297. AR4, Summary, supra note 34, at 13.
298. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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gas emissions standards. But before implementing the regulations,
California must obtain a waiver of federal preemption under the
Clean Air Act from EPA. In considering California's request for a
waiver to implement the regulations, the U.S. EPA continues to do
nothing.
However, the time has come for EPA to act. The U.S. Supreme
Court has informed EPA that it has authority to regulate greenhouse
gases under the Clean Air Act and warned the agency that its justifi-
cations to date for not enacting regulations are invalid. In reconsid-
ering the petition for rulemaking, EPA can only avoid regulation by
determining that there is insufficient scientific evidence that green-
house gases led to climate change. While the nation currently waits
for EPA to act, the agency is under intense political pressure from
California to grant a waiver for the state to implement its own auto-
mobile greenhouse gas emissions program. While EPA is required
to grant California a waiver pursuant to the state's broad authority to
independently regulate automobile emissions under the Clean Air
Act, the agency is again standing silent. However, EPA may be
compelled to grant California the waiver by the threat of having to
defend its inaction in a federal suit filed by the state. In order to
avoid additional litigation, EPA should grant California's waiver
request and allow the state to regulate automobile greenhouse gas
emissions pursuant to AB 1493.
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